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INTRODUCTION 
The electronic processing of health data provides invaluable bene-
fits to patients and health care providers. These benefits include speed 
and flexibility of information processing, retrieval, and communication; 
long-term cost savings due to increased efficiency; and the availability 
of powerful computational techniques that can contribute to improved 
patient outcomes.! Unfortunately, some of these same attributes enable 
the operation of a market in illicitly obtained private health informa-
tion. The Internet provides a nearly ideal channel for trafficking in 
such information because it permits the information to be transmitted 
anywhere in the world quickly, cheaply, and with relatively little risk of 
detection.2 This Article analyzes the threats to electronic health records 
and the deficiencies of regulations that have been enacted to address 
them.3 It also develops recommendations for improving safeguards for 
these records. 4 
The risks associated with the electronic storage and transmission 
of personal information in general and health data in particular are 
indeed grave. A New Year's Day 2006 article in the New York Times in-
cluded the following statement 
Every week seems to bring reports of a new breach of the com-
puter networks that contain our most intimate personal infor-
mation. Scores of companies--including Bank of America, 
MasterCard, ChokePoint and Marriott International-have 
admitted to security lapses that exposed millions of people's 
financial information to potential abuse by identity thieves.5 
Another article reported that between February and June of 2005 alone, 
"businesses, universities, and government agencies lost ... ten million 
records" and that, according to a Gallup poll conducted in August of 
2005, nearly one out of five Americans experienced identity theft 6 In 
1 See Nicolas P. Terry & Leslie P. Francis, Ensuring the Privacy and Confidentiality of Elec-
tront"c Health Records. 2007 U. ILL. L REv. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 2, on file with au-
thors} (discussing the advantages of electronic health records). 
2 See Young B. Choi et al., Challenges Associated with Privacy in Health Care Industry: Im-
plementation of HIPAA and the Security Rules, 30 J. MEn. Svs. 57, 60 (2006) (stating that pri-
vate information can be distributed worldwide within seconds) . 
.!1 See infra notes 5-30, 48-193 and accompanying text 
4 See infra notes 194-333 and accompanying text. 
5 John Schwartz, The Nation: Spy Game; What Are You Lookin' at?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 
2006, § 4. at 1. 
6 Daniel B. Prieto, Data Mine: Stopping Identity Thift, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 19, 2005, at 
17. 
--------------~ 
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May of 2006, a burglary at the home of a Department of Veterans Affairs 
employee resulted in the well-publicized theft of cliscs containing names, 
birthdates, and Social Security numbers of as many as 26.5 million mili-
tary veterans.7 Even private cell phone use is vulnerable to public clisclo-
sure. 8 Reportedly, dozens of Internet-based companies sell information 
concerning calls made and received by cell phone users, which they ob-
tain by posing as customers and asking for copies of bills. 9 
The confidentiality of personal health information appears to be 
compromised with disturbing frequency. A report that focused on dis-
carded hard drives and disk sanitization practices disclosed that in Au-
gust of 2002, the U.S. Veterans Administration Medical Center in Indi-
anapolis sold or donated 139 of its old computers without removing 
confidential information contained on their hard drives, including the 
names of veterans who had AIDS and mental illnesses. 10 An earlier pa-
per published by the British Medical Association reported numerous 
instances of private health information abuse, including the case of a 
banker who served on a state health commission and obtained a list of 
all cancer patients in his state, which he used to single out these indi-
viduals and call in their loans. 11 On April 26, 2006, Aetna announced 
that a laptop computer containing personal information concerning 
38,000 consumers had been stolen, and on May 12, 2006, a newspaper 
article reported that a computer breach may have led to the theft of 
personal information relating to 60,000 patients who visited Ohio Uni-
versity's health center.l2 Other reported incidents include an inadver-
tent Internet posting of identifying information and details of the sex 
lives of ninety psychotherapy patients, an inadvertent posting of sixty 
children's psychological records on the University of Montana's web-
site, a hacker's illegal downloading of thousands of patients' medical 
files from a university medical center, and the stealing of health infor-
7 David Stout & Tom Zeller, Vast Data Cache About Veterans Has Been Stolen, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 23, 2006, atAl. 
a See Sheryl Harris, Are Your Cell Phone Records Safe? Web-Based Companies Offer Data Tell-
ing Numbers You Called for as Little as $100, PurN DEALER, jan. 14, 2006, at AI (reporting 
that one company charges only $100 for information about a customer's last 100 calls). 
9 Id. 
10 Simson L. Garfinkel & Abhi Shelat, Remembrance of Data Passed: A Study of Disk Saniti-
zation Practices, 1 IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY 17, 17 (2003). 
II Ross J. ANDERSON, BRITISH MED. Ass'N, SECURITY IN CLINICAL INFORMATION Svs-
TEI'\15 5 {1996) (citation omitted). 
12 Jennifer Gonzalez, 3rd Computer Breach at OU Within 3 Weeks: Recards Involve 60,000 
Who Used Health Center, PLAIN DEALER, May 12, 2006, at Al; see Press Release, Aetna, State-
ment of CEO and President Ronald A Williams on Data Security (Apr. 26, 2006), available 
at http:/ /WW1.v.aetna.com/ news/2006/pr_ 20060426.htm. 
334 Boston College Law Review [VoL 48:331 
marion belonging to military personnel and their families from a con-
tractor's database.!' 
Why would anyone want to obtain the health information of oth-
ers? The reasons are numerous. Private health information can be use-
ful to employers who wish to hire and retain the healthiest employees, 14 
lenders and other businesses with a stake in individuals' financial fu-
tures and thus in their health statuses,15 drug companies that wish to 
influence doctors' prescribing decisions, 16 advertisers and marketers 
who wish to tailor their material for particular audiences,l7 health in-
surers making eligibility and premium rate decisions concerning indi-
vidual insurance policies, and even educational institutions that might 
wish to recruit and accept students with the greatest potential for suc-
cess and longevity. In a world in which electronic health information 
t.!l DANIEL j. SOLOVE, ThE DIGITAL PERSON 54-55 (2004); see also Nicolas P. Terry, To 
HIPAA, a Son: Assessing the Technica~ Conceptua~ and Legal Frameworks Jar Patient Safety Infor-
mation, 12 WIDENER L. REv. 133, 163 (2005) (describing other examples of dysfunctional 
"privacy and security systems"). 
H ANDERSON, supra note 11, at 5 (reporting that as of 1995, "over half of America's 
largest 500 companies admitted using health records to make hiring and other personnel 
decisions"). It should be noted, however, that these health records were most likely lawfully 
obtained because the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (the "ADA") permits medical 
testing of applicants and employees with some limitations, though it forbids discrimination 
against qualified employees with disabilities. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (a), (d) (2000). Em-
ployees who are sick or vulnerable to illness are often unappealing to employers because 
they can cause absenteeism, productivity, scheduling, and morale problems in the work-
place and can raise health insurance costs. Questions concerning the meaning of the 
terms "qualified" and "disability," and thus the ADA's scope of coverage, have generated 
considerable litigation. See generally Sharona Hoffman, Corrective Justice and Title I of the 
ADA, 52 AM. U. L. REv. 1213 (2003). 
IS ANDERSON, supra note 11, at 6 (reporting that a network is being built by a credit 
reference agency to trade health records). 
Ifi Id. at 5 (stating that a U.S. drug company purchased a health systems company and 
obtained a prescription database for fifty-six million people, which it was planning to 
search for individuals whose prescriptions suggested that they suffered from depression 
and could benefit from Prozac, a drug produced by the company); see also Robert Stein-
brook, For Sale: Physicians' Prescribing Data, 354 NEW ENG. J. MEo. 2745, 2745 (2006) (re· 
porting that during the last two decades, health care information companies routinely 
have purchased electronic prescription records from pharmacies and elsewhere, which 
they then sold to drug manufacturers); Stephanie Saul, Doctars Ofdect as Drng Makers Learn 
Who~ Prescribing What, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2006, at A1 (describing computerized records 
with information concerning physicians and the drugs they prescribe that are used by 
drug sales representatives to influence doctors to write more prescriptions for drugs pro-
duced by their companies or fewer prescriptions of a competitor's drugs). 
17 Prieto, supra note 6, at 18 (asserting that "[a]s advertisers have sought greater return 
on their doiiar, they are increasingly relying on personal data to target ads" based on par-
ticular attributes); see also Terry, supra note 13, at 162 (stating that Pin is "valuable for 
secondary uses" such as marketing). 
... 
~~~~~~~---,~~~~~~~~~~~~·j] 
:J , 
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can be easily stolen or accessed, it could also become increasingly ap-
pealing to blackmailers and other criminals.18 For example, after a 
computer was stolen from a general medical practice, two prominent 
women received letters from blackmailers who threatened to publicize 
the fact that the women had undergone abortions. 19 Even potential 
romantic partners looking for a low-risk mate might try to obtain per-
sonal health information if it were easily accessible. 
Trafficking in personal health information poses a significant risk 
to the public. Once the data is dispersed on the Internet, it becomes 
available to anyone who is willing to pay for it, 2° and it cannot be ex-
punged. Consequently, the harm to an individual from illicit or acci-
dental disclosure of health information is potentially unlimited. It is 
quite possible for the affected individual to remain unaware of the dis-
closure and its consequences,"~ and it may be difficult or impossible to 
establish how the disclosure actually occurred. Loss or corruption of 
health data can also require the duplication of painful medical tests or 
even cause serious and life-threatening medical errors. 
Americans are aware of these dangers. A 2005 National Consumer 
Health Privacy Survey, which queried 2000 people, revealed that sixty-
seven percent of respondents were "somewhat" or "very concerned" 
about the confidentiality of their medical records.22 Furthermore, thir-
teen percent of respondents claimed that they had attempted to pro-
tect their own privacy by avoiding medical tests or visits to their regular 
physicians, asking doctors to distort diagnoses, or paying for tests out-
of-pocket so that no medical documentation would be sent to insur-
ance companies.23 
To address the data security threats associated with the electronic 
storage and transmission of private health information, the U.S. De-
ta See ANDERSON, supra note 11, at 5; COMPUTER Sci. & TEI.ECOMM. Bo., NAT'L RE-
SEARCH CoUNCIL, FOR THE RECORD: PROTECTING ELECTRONIC HEALTH INFORMATION 3 
(1997) (stating that hackers may penetrate computerized systems to steal data, destroy it, 
or damage the system). 
19 ANDERSON, supra note 11, at 5. 
20 See id. at 6 (reporting that a network is being built by a credit reference agency to 
trade health records). 
21 See Prieto, supra note 6, at 17 (stating that the average victim becomes aware of iden-
tity theft only after fourteen months, but in some cases discovering the crime takes ten 
years). This Article does not specificaiJy address the theft of PHI, which could be hidden 
more easily because the consumer \viii not see suspicious charges on her credit card or tell-
tale credit reports. 
22 LYNNE "SAM., BISHOP ET AL., CAL. HEAL THCARE FoUND., NATIONAL CONSUMER 
HEALTH PRIVACY SURVEY 2005: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3 (2005). 
:!!1 Id. at4. 
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partment of Health and Human Services ("HHS") enacted the Security 
Rule under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 
1996 ("HIPAA").24 The Security Rule is part of the larger HIPAA Privacy 
Rule established in the HIPAA privacy regulations25 promulgated pursu-
ant to HIPAA's statutory authority. 26 
The HIPAA Security Rule, which became effective on April 20, 
2005 for most covered entities,27 delineates administrative, physical, and 
technical safeguards to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and avail-
ability of electronic protected health information ("PH1").2B Under the 
Rule, PHI includes "individually identifiable health information" that is 
electronically or otherwise transmitted or maintained.29 "Covered enti-
ties" include health plans, health care clearinghouses, and health care 
providers that transmit health information electronically.'" 
Many have criticized various aspects of the broader HIPAA Privacy 
Rule,'1 but few have focused specifically on the regulations' Security 
Rule. It is our view that the HIPAA Security Rule has serious deficien-
24 See 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.302-.318 (2006); see a/.so Security and Electronic Signature Stan-
dards, 63 Fed. Reg. 43,242, 43,242-43 (Aug. 12, 1998) (providing background concerning 
the Security Rule's purpose). 
"45 C.F.R. §§ 160.101-.534. 
"42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d to 1320d.S (2000 & Supp. ill 2003). 
27 45 C.F.R. § 164.318. Small health plans were given an extended adjustment period 
and were required to comply with the Rule by April 20, 2006. Id. 
I d. 
"Id. §§ 164308-.312. 
"Id. § 160.103. 
!O 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2006). A health care clearinghouse is defined as follows: 
[A] public or private entity, including a billing service, repricing company, 
community health management information system or community health in-
formation system, and "value-addedn networks and switches, that does either 
of the following functions: 
(1) Processes or facilitates the processing of health information received from 
another entity in a nonstandard format or containing nonstandard data con-
tent into standard data elements or a standard transaction. 
(2) Receives a standard transaction from another entity and processes or fa-
cilitates the processing of health information into nonstandard format or 
nonstandard data content for the receiving entity. 
.91 See PEw INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, ExPosED ONLINE: WHY THE NEW FEDERAL 
HEALTH PRIVACY REGULATION DoESN'T OFFER MUCH PROTECTION TO INTERNET UsERS 6-8 
(2001) (discussing the fact that many health-related websites are not covered entities); So-
LOVE, supra note 13, at 70 (stating that the "HHPAA regulations have apparently pleased no-
body" because health care providers "complain that the regulations are too complicated, 
cumbersome, and expensive to follow" and privacy advocates "find the regulations weak and 
ineffective"). 
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des that hinder its efficacy as a mechanism to impede the operation of 
a market in illicitly obtained Pill. 
These deficiencies are of four principal types. First, the IDPAA 
statute, and thus the Security Rule, do not address trafficking in private 
health information by businesses and individuals outside of the health 
industry, such as employers, marketers, and lenders that are not "cov-
ered entities. "32 Consequently, these parties are permitted to handle 
health data without restriction under IDPAA.33 Second, although the 
IDPAA Privacy Rule allows patients to inspect and copy their Pill,34 it 
does not enable individuals to establish the provenance of the data or 
verify how the information has been used. 35 Third, the IDPAA Security 
Rule gives covered entities an excessive amount of discretion in decid-
ing what implementation specifications they wiii address and how they 
will do so, and many of its standards and implementation specifications 
lack sufficient detail and specificity.36 As a result, careless or unscrupu-
lous covered entities are very likely to become the main source of iiiic-
itly obtained Pill.37 Furthermore, weii-meaning but resource-poor cov-
ered entities that cannot develop sophisticated expertise with respect to 
computer security technology are given insufficient guidance as to how 
to achieve compliance with the Security Rule.'" Fourth, the IDPAA pri-
vacy regulations, including the Security Rule, do not establish a private 
cause of action for aggrieved individuals.'9 Thus, insufficient enforce-
ment mechanisms significantly diminish the regulations' deterrence and 
remedial powers. <o 
The remainder of this Article proceeds as foiiows. Part I describes 
the relevant Security Rule provisions.41 Part II critiques the Rule and 
" See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103(3) (defining a "covered entity" as a "health plan," "health 
care clearinghouse," or "health care provider who transmits any health information in 
electronic form in connection with a transaction covered by this subchapter"). 
!1!1 See id. 
34 !d.§ 164.524(a) (1) (establishing that an "individual has a right of access to inspect 
and obtain a copy of protected health information about the individual in a designated 
record set"). 
!15 See id. 
"See 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(b) (2006) (establishing that "[c) overed entities may use any 
security measures that allow the covered entity to reasonably and appropriately implement 
the standards and implementation specifications" of the Security Rule in a provision enti-
tled "Flexibility of approach"). 
37 See id. 
sa See id. 
39 See id. §§ 160.300-.552; Peter A Winn, Confidentiality in Cyberspace: The HIPAA Privacy 
Rules and the Common Law, 33 RuTGERS LJ. 617, 618 (2002). 
"See45 C.F.R. §§ 160.300--.552. 
41 See infra notes 48-91 and accompanying text 
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exposes its weaknesses.42 To address the Security Rule's deficiencies, 
this Article proposes in Part Ill a detailed set of recommendations for 
enhancing PHI security.-tl We acknowledge the challenge of crafting 
static regulations for an area that is dynamic by nature because both 
computer technology and security threats are continually changing. We 
also recognize the potential tension between patients' needs for privacy 
safeguards and businesses' needs for efficient and profitable opera-
tions. We have considered the implications of our proposal in a variety 
of circumstances and have evaluated them through detailed examples. 
Our recommendations include: (1) expanding the definition of 
"covered entity" to include any person who knowingly stores or trans-
mits individually identifiable health information in electronic form for 
any business purpose related to the substance of such information;« 
(2) broadening the right of access to PHI so that affected individuals 
can obtain information concerning its provenance and uses;45 (3) revis-
ing several of the Security Rule's provisions to provide further detail 
and guidance, and establishing mechanisms that will facilitate compli-
ance;46 and ( 4) adding a private cause of action to the law's enforce-
ment scheme. 47 Although we focus our critique on the Security Rule, 
some of our recommendations, such as changes in statutory definitions 
and scope, necessarily would extend to the Privacy Rule as a whole. 
I. THE HIP M SECURITY RULE 
The HIPM Security Rule establishes general security requirements 
and provides implementers with broad discretion in choosing appro-
priate technologies to implement the standards.4B One of the Rule's 
guiding principles is "technological neutrality," an approach based on 
the belief that regulators should not dictate the use of specific tech-
nologies, which may be inappropriate in particular settings or super-
seded by improved tecbnologies.49 It is clear from the public comments 
42 See infra notes 92-193 and accompanying text 
411 See infra notes 194-333 and accompanying text 
44 See infra notes 198-212 and accompanying text. 
45 See infra notes 239-243 and accompanying text 
46 See infra notes 244-318 and accompanying text. 
47 &e infra notes 319-333 and accompanying text. 
48 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.302-.318 (2006); see also Health Insurance Reform: Security Stan-
dards, 68 Fed. Reg. 8334, 8336 (Feb. 20, 2003) (stating that the final Rule was written "to 
frame the standards in terms that are as generic as possible and which, generally speaking, 
may be met through various approaches or technologies"). 
49 See Health Insurance Reform: Security Standards, 68 Fed Reg. at 8335 (describing 
the drafters' "basic assumptions that the entities affected by this regulation are so varied in 
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received by HHS to the initial proposed version of the Security Rule 
that industry strongly favored such discretion. 5o 
A. HIPAA Securit;y Requirements 
The Security Rule establishes four general requirements. Covered 
entities must: (l) ensure the "confidentiality, integrity, and availability" 
of electronic health information that they produce, obtain, maintain, 
or transmit; (2) protect the data against reasonably anticipated threats 
to its security or integrity; (3) safeguard against impermissible use or 
disclosure of the information; and ( 4) ensure that their employees com-
ply with the Rule.51 Covered entities may choose the means by which to 
"reasonably and appropriately" implement the Rule's standards, so long 
as they consider their size, complexity, capabilities, and technical infra-
structure in making their decisions along with the costs of implementa-
tion and the risks of security breaches. 52 
The HIPAA Security Rule features "standards" and then "imple-
mentation specifications" that provide instructions concerning how to 
fulfill the obligations outlined in the standards. There are two types of 
implementation specifications: required and addressable.53 Required 
implementation specifications are mandatory.54 By contrast, implemen-
ters may respond to an addressable implementation specification in one 
of three ways: (l) by implementing it, (2) by implementing an "equiva-
lent alternative measure," or (3) by doing neither because implementa-
tion would not be "reasonable and appropriate. "55 A covered entity that 
does not implement an addressable implementation specification must 
document its justification for not doing so,S6 and all covered entities 
terms of installed technology, size, resources, and relative risk, that it would be impossible 
to dictate a specific solution or set of solutions that would be useable by all covered enti-
ties"). 
so Id. {stating that "[m]any commenters also supported the concept of technological 
neutrality, which would afford them the flexibility to select appropriate technology solu-
tions and to adopt new technology over time"); see also id. at 8336 (explaining that numer-
ous commentators asserted that "the security standards should not be overly prescriptive 
because the speed with which technology is evolving could make specific requirements 
obsolete and might in fact deter technological progress"). · 
51 45 C.F.R § 164.306(a). Permissible and impermissible uses of private health infor-
mation are described in Subpart E of the HIPAA Privacy Rule. I d. §§ 154.500-.534. 
"Id. § 154.305(b). 
"Id. § 154.305(d). 
"45 C.F.R. § 154.305(d) (2) (2005). 
"Id. § 154.305(d) (3). 
55 Id. § 154.305(d) (3) (li) (B) (I). 
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must review their compliance and modifY their security measures as 
needed. 57 
1. Administrative Safeguards 
Several required implementation specifications are intended to 
provide administrative safeguards. sa These safeguards include risk analy-
sis and risk management practices, the establishment of sanctions for 
noncompliant employees, and information system activity reviews.59 
Covered entities also must identifY a "security official" who is responsible 
for compliance with the Security Ru1e and establish procedures whereby 
only authorized individuals have access to electronic PID.60 To achieve 
workforce security, a covered entity shou1d implement authorization 
and supervision standards, workforce clearance procedures, and termi-
nation of authorization procedures, but these are considered address-
able implementation specifications. 51 
In addition, a covered entity shou1d implement a security aware-
ness and training program for its workforce and implement measures 
such as security reminders, mechanisms that protect against malicious 
software, log-in monitoring, and password management.62 The Security 
Rule mandates the creation of response and reporting mechanisms for 
security incidents63 and contingency plans that focus on data backup, 
disaster recovery, emergency mode operation, testing and revision pro-
cedures, and analysis of the criticality of the affected data and applica-
tions. 54 It also instructs that covered entities should perform periodic 
evaluations of their compliance65 and may enter into written contracts 
or other arrangements with business associates to handle electronic 
Pill, so long as the associates provide satisfactory assurances that they 
will appropriately safeguard the data. 66 The Security Rule, however, 
does not apply to the transmission of electronic PHI to another health 
57 Id. § I64.306(e). 
"Id. § I64.308{a). 
· "'45 C.F.R § l64.308(a) (I) (ii). 
"45 C.F.R § l64.308(a) (2)-(3) {i) (2006). 
fil Id.§ J64.308{a)(3)(ii). 
fi!! ld. § 164 . .308{a) (5). These are addressable implementation specifications. Id. 
"ld. § J64.308(a) (6). 
64 /d.§ 164 . .308(a) (7). The development of testing and revision procedures and appli-
cations and data criticality analysis are addressable implementation specifications. Id. The 
other safeguards are required. ld. 
"45 C.F.R § l64..308(a)(8). 
66 45 C.F.R § l64.308(b) (I), {3)-(4) (2006); see also id. § I64.3I4 (listing specifications 
regarding business associate contracts and other arrangements). 
.---
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care provider who is treating the patient, a group health plan sponsor, 
or agencies determining eligibility for government programs providing 
public benefits. 67 
2. Physical Safeguards 
The HIPAA Security Rule next establishes physical safeguards aimed 
at thwarting unauthorized access to electronic information systems and 
the facilities in which they are housed while ensuring access to author-
ized personnel. 68 This subsection describes several "addressable" imple-
mentation specifications regarding contingency operations, fucility secu-
rity plans, access control and validation procedures, and maintenance of 
records concerning repairs and modifications to security-related compo-
nents of the physical plant. 69 
In addition to safeguarding workstation security,7° a covered entity 
must establish procedures that govern the movement of hardware that 
contains electronic Pill within and outside of the facility in question.71 
These procedures should address electronic media disposal, removal of 
PHI in cases in which equipment will be reused for other purposes, 
maintenance of records of the hardware's whereabouts and who is re-
sponsible for it, and data backup and storage prior to moving equip-
ment.72 
3. Technical Safeguards 
The required and addressabJe73 technical safeguards detailed by 
the HIPAA Security Rule are designed to ensure that only authorized 
personnel have access to electronic PID.74 These safeguards include 
assigning unique user identification names or numbers, establishing 
emergency access procedures, having an automatic logoff after a spe-
cific period of inactivity, and implementing encryption and decryption 
67 !d.§§ 164.308(b) (2), .502(e) (I) (ii) (C). 
"Jd. § 164.310(a)(1). 
"Id. § 164.310(a) (2). 
"Jd. § 164.310(b)-(c). 
7! 45 C.F.R § 164.310(d) (1). 
72 45 C.F.R § 164.310(d)(2) (2005). The implementation specifications for disposal 
and media reuse are required, while the record-keeping and data backup and storage re-
quirements are addressable. /d. 
7!1 See infra notes 75-76 (indicating which safeguards are required and which are ad-
dressable). 
"45 C.F.R § 164.312(a) (I) . 
342 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 48:331 
mechanisms.75 This provision also discusses audit controls, authentica-
tion mechanisms for electronic PHI and its users, and measures to en-
sure security when electronic PHI is transmitted electronically.76 
B. Enforcement 
The HIPAA legislation authorizes both civil and criminal penal-
ties.?? Given that HHS is not authorized to conduct criminal prosecu-
tions, however, the privacy regulations only address the civil penalties.78 
Under a Final Rule issued by HHS on February 16, 2006, the HIPAA 
Privacy Rule's enforcement provisions also are applicable to the Secu-
rity Rule.79 Thus, if a covered entity discloses health information in an 
unauthorized manner for any reason, it can be penalized. 80 In addition, 
it can be penalized for the absence of appropriate security measures 
even if no PHI is disclosed.Bl 
These provisions establish a primarily complaint-driven enforce-
ment scheme for privacy violations.82 Persons83 who believe that a cov-
ered entity is violating the Privacy Rule may submit a complaint to the 
Secretary of HHS, who has discretion as to whether to investigate it 84 
The authority to administer and enforce the Security Rule has been 
delegated to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services ("CMS"), 
75 Id. § 164.312(a)(2). Unique user identification and emergency access procedures 
are required, while automatic logoff and encryption and decryption mechanisms are ad-
dressable implementation specifications. I d. 
'iii ld. § 164.312(b)-(e). Mechanisms for infonnation authentication and integrity con-
trols for the transmission of data are designated addressable. Jd. 
77 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d-5 to 1320d.fi (2000). The criminal penalty provision is discussed 
further infra no.te 88 and accompanying text. 
78 45 C.F.R §§ 160.400-.426 (2006). 
79 HIPAA Administrative Simplification: Enforcement, 71 Fed. Reg. 8390, 8390 (Feb. 
16, 2006) (stating that "[t]he final rule amends the existing rules relating to investigation 
of noncompliance" and the imposition of penalties uta make them apply to all of the HI-
PM Administrative Simplification rules, rather than exclusively to the privacy standards"); 
see also 45 C.F.R § 160.300 (making the enforcement provisions applicable to all ffiPAA 
rules, including the Security Rule). Originally, the enforcement provisions applied only to 
Subpart E of the Privacy Rule, which limits the circumstances under which covered entities 
can use and disclose PHI. See 45 C.F.R §§ 164.500-.534. 
" 45 C.F.R §§ 164.500-.534. 
Bl ld. §§ 164.302-.318. 
B2 HIPAA Administrative Simplification: Enforcement, 70 Fed. Reg. 20,224, 20,226 
(Apr. 18, 2005). The regulations, however, also provide that HHS may conduct compliance 
reviews without receiving a complaint 45 C.F.R § 160.308; .HIPAAAdministrative Simplifi-
cation: Enforcement, 70 Fed. Reg. at 20,226. 
83 A uperson" is defined as a unatural person, trust or estate, partnersllip, corporation, pro-
fessional association or corporation, or other entity, public or private." 45 C.F.R § 160.103. 
"45 C.F.R § 160.306(a), (c) (2006). 
-------------------~ 
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and thus, CMS investigates alleged violations relating to the Security 
Rule speci:fically.85 If a covered entity is found to be noncompliant, it 
will be informed by the Secretary, who will, if possible, attempt to re-
solve the matter informally.86 The Secretary has authority to impose civil 
penalties for noncompliance in an amount not to exceed $100 per vio-
lation, or $25,000 during a calendar year "for all violations of an identi-
cal requirement."87 In addition, violators may be subject to criminal 
prosecution and fined up to $250,000 and may face imprisonment for 
up to ten years. 88 A respondent may also request a hearing before an 
administrative law judge (an "ALJ") .89 As is typical in administrative 
BS Statement of Organization, Functions, and Delegation of Authority Notice, 68 Fed. 
Reg. 60,694, 60,694 (OcL 23, 2003). On March 25, 2005, CMS issued a notice entitled 
"Procedures for Non-Privacy Administrative Simplification Complaints Under the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996," which became effective on April 25, 
2005. 70 Fed. Reg. 15,329, 15,33!}-31 (Mar. 25, 2005). The notice states that ifCMS finds a 
violation based on a complaint. it will work with the covered entity "to obtain voluntary 
compliance." Id. In the absence of cooperation, "the Secretary wiii pursue other options, 
such as . .. civil money penalties." Id. at 15,331. 
"45 C.F.R. § 160.312(a)(1). 
B7 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-5(a)(1) (2000); 45 C.F.R. § 160.508. A civil penalcy may not be 
imposed for a violation if it is punishable as a criminal offense under 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6, 
which is administered by the Department of Justice. 42 U.S. C. § 1320d-5(b) (1); HIPAA 
Administrative Simplification: Enforcement, 70 Fed. Reg. at 20,237. 
sa See 42 U.S. C. § 1320d-6. This provision, entitled 'Wrongful disclosure of individually 
identifiable health information," states: 
I d. 
(a) Offense 
A person who knowingly and in violation of this part-
(1) uses or causes to be used a unique health identifier; 
(2) obtains individually identifiable health information relating to an in-
dividual; or 
(3) discloses individually identifiable health information to another per-
son, shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section. 
(b) Penalties 
A person described in subsection (a) of this section shall-
(1) be fined not more than $50,000, imprisoned not more than 1 year, or 
both; 
(2) if the offense is committed under false pretenses, be fined not more 
than $100,000, imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both; and 
(3) if the offense is committed with intent to sell, transfer, or use individu-
ally identifiable health information for commercial advantage, personal gain, 
or malicious harm, be fined not more than $250,000, imprisoned not more 
than 10 years, or both. 
"45 C.F.R. § 160.504(a). 
·~----------- _,.,; 
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proceedings, only limited discovery is permitted, 90 and the ALJ is gen-
erally not bound by the Federal Rules ofEvidence.91 
II. A CRITIQUE OF THE SECURITY RULE 
The HIPAA Security Rule is characterized by several flaws and de-
ficiencies that greatly detract from its efficacy. These relate to the nar-
row definition of "covered entity," the limited access individuals have to 
information concerning their PHI, the Rule's insufficient compliance 
guidelines, and the lack of a private cause of action for Privacy Rule 
violations. This Part will analyze aJl of these shortcomings. 
A. Covered Entities 
The HIPAA Security Rule follows its enabling legislation, the HI-
PAA statute, and covers only health plans, health care clearinghouses, 
and health care providers that transmit health information electroni-
ca!ly.92 Consequently, doctors, hospitals, pharmacists, health insurers, 
and health maintenance organizations ("HMOs") must comply with the 
HIPAA privacy standards, but not aJl parties possessing PHI are cov-
ered. 93 Thus, websites selling nonprescription medications or dispens-
ing medical advice,94 employers handling applicants' and employees' 
medical records, marketers, or any other business entities that obtain 
PHI are not bound by the requirements of the HIPAA Security Rule.95 
The Rule's narrow scope of coverage compromises its ability to protect 
Americans against misuse of their PHI. It leaves the vast amount of 
health information stored on systems maintained by noncovered enti-
ties especia!lyvuloerable to theft, destruction, or alteration.96 
In fact, it is arguable that the greatest PHI-related threats are asso-
ciated with the acquisition of PHI by non-health-care-related entities. 
"See45 C.F.R § 160.516 (2006). 
91 Id. § 160.540. 
"Id. § 160.102(a). 
95 SO LOVE, supra note 13, at 208; Wino, supra note 39, at 618 (affirming that the "Rules 
do not subject to legal sanction any of the numerous entities whose access to personal 
health information has exploded with the increased use of electronic health informa-
tion"). 
94 See PE\V INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, supra note 31, at 6--8; David L. Baumer et al., 
Internet Privacy Law: A Comparison Between the United States and the European Union, 23 Cor.r-
PUTERS & SECURITY 400, 410 (2004) (emphasizing that websites in the United States are 
not regulated with respect to most transactions, including those involving health informa-
tion). 
95 SoLOVE, supra note 13, at 208. 
95 CoMPUTER Sci. & 'Th:LEcoMM. Bo., supra note 18, at3. 
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Many commentators have expressed concern that clisclosure of health 
information can lead to loss of various types of insurance; employment 
and educational cliscrimination; denial of loans; and severe clisadvan-
tages in custody battles, adoption efforts, parole proceedings, and per-
sonal injury lawsuits. 97 Blackmail, identity theft, and other crimes per-
petrated by those with access to illicitly obtained PHI are also grave 
dangers.9B 
The European Union (the "E.U.") has tackled the contemporary 
threat to privacy by non-health-care-related entities very aggressively. 
The E.U. Privacy Directive provides wide-ranging privacy protection.99 
It binds ''Member States"100 and extends to the processing of all per-
sonal data by any party, with few exceptions.101 Specifically, the Direc-
tive's broad language establishes that "Member States shall prohibit the 
processing of personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political 
opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, 
and the processing of data concerning health or sex life. "102 It then de-
lineates exceptions to the rule, which, in the case of health informa-
tion, relate to the provision of meclical care.I03 
By contrast, the United States has a much more segmented ap-
proach to privacy, though it has enacted numerous inclividual Jaws that 
address privacy issues. The Privacy Act of 1974, for example, governs all 
federal agencies.1°4 The law forbids the disclosure of personal informa-
tion (with some exceptions), aims to safeguard the security of records, 
and allows inclividuals to review their records and request corrections 
of errors.105 Although the law covers only federal agencies, it is in some 
ways much broader than the HIPAA Privacy RuJe because it defines "re-
cord" to mean not only meclical data, but also identifiable information 
97 Janet L. Dolgin, Personhood, Discrimination, and the New Genetics, 66 BROOK. L. REv. 
755, 764-65 (200l);Joanne L. Hustead &Janlori Goldman, Genetics and Privacy, 2BA:r.t.J.L. 
& MED. 285, 288 (2002); Mark A. Rothstein & Sharona Hoffman, Genetic Testing. Genetic 
Medicine, andManawd Caro 34 WAitE FOREST L. REv. 849, 887 (1999). 
9B See supra notes 5-23 and accompanying text. 
!l9 See generally Parliament and Council Directive 95/46/EC, On the Protection oflndi-
vidua1s with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such 
Data, 1995 OJ. (L 281) 31 [hereinafter E.U. Privacy Directive]. 
1on ld. arL 1, 'j1, 1995 OJ. (L 281) at 38. 
lOt Jd. art. 3, 1: 2, 1995 OJ. (L 281) at 39. The exceptions include matters such as the 
processing of information for security purposes or criminal law and processing "by a natu-
ral person in the course of a purely personal or household activity." !d. 
1o> !d. arL 8, 'j1, 1995 OJ. (L 281) at 40. 
"' Id. arL 8, 'j1 2-3, 1995 OJ. (L 281) at 40-41. 
104 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000). 
"' Id. § 552a(b)-(e). 
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about people's "education, financial transactions, medical history, and 
criminal or employment history."I06 
Title V of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act is devoted to privacy.107 It 
requires financial institutions to respect customers' privacy and shield 
the security and confidentiality of customers' private information.108 To 
this end, the law prohibits financial institutions from disclosing "non-
public personal information" to a nonaffiliated third party if the disclo-
sure is not authorized by the law109 and requires regulatory agencies to 
establish standards concerning appropriate "administrative, technical, 
and physical safeguards" for private information. no 
A number of other laws also protect privacy in particular realms. 
The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 governs the ac-
cessibility and disclosure of certain student records.111 The Cable Com-
munications Policy Act of 1984 mandates that cable operators inform 
subscribers of any personal information that is collected, the disclosure 
of such information, and the subscribers' right of access to the informa-
tion.112 Information cannot be collected or disclosed without the cus-
tomer's written or electronic consent unless it is needed for a '1egiti-
mate business activity. "113 The Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
governs electronic surveillance and restricts searches and interception 
of wire, oral, and electronic communications.114 The Video Privacy Pro-
tection Act of 1988 provides that video store operators may not disclose 
the titles of the videos rented or purchased by any particular customer, 
though some exceptions apply.115 The Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 
1994 requires states to obtain a driver's consent before divulging per-
sonal information contained in motor vehicle records to marketers, 
unless one of the stated exceptions is applicable.116 The Children's 
Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 establishes that operators of web-
106 See id. § 552a( 4). 
107 Seel5 u.s.c. §§ 6801-6827 (2000). 
1
" Id. § 6801(a). 
w• Id. § 6802(a)-(b). 
11o Id. § 6801(b). 
11120 u.s. c.§ 1232g (2000). 
112 47 U.S. C.§ 551(a)-(d) (2000 & Supp. Til 2003). 
WI Id. § 55l(b)-(c). The law further provides that cable operators may not disclose to 
the government "records revealing cable subscriber selection of video programming from 
a cable operator" and must destroy personally identifiable information when it is no 
longer needed. Id. § 551 (c)(2)(D). (e). 
114]8 u.s.c. §§ 2511, 2701 (2000). 
115]8 U.S.C. § 2710(a) (3), (b) (I) (2000). 
116]8 u.s.c. § 2721 (2000). 
I 
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sites targeted at children must acquire parental consent to use the per-
sonal data of children under the age ofthirteen.117 
The laws cliscussed above provide varying degrees of privacy pro-
tection to in clivi duals with respect to particular kinds of information or 
particular holders of private information.118 It is unlikely that the 
United States will be willing to adopt a privacy law that is as far-reaching 
as the E.U. Privacy Directive. In the spirit of already existing U.S. legis-
lation, however, we should have at the very least a law that narrowly tar-
gets only health information but is broad enough to include within its 
scope all parties that maintain or transmit such information in elec-
tronic form for business reasons related to the substance of the PHI. 
This approach already has been suggested in a bipartisan bill in-
troduced by Senator Hillary Clinton and then-Senator Bill Frist, enti-
tled the Health Technology to Enhance Quality Act of2005.119 The bill 
was designed "[t] o reduce healthcare costs, improve efficiency, and im-
prove healthcare quality through the development of a nationwide in-
teroperable health information technology system. "120 The bill pro-
vided that the HIPAA privacy regulations be amended to "apply to any 
health information stored or transmitted in an electronic format. "121 In 
Part III of this Article, we similarly recommend that the term "covered 
entity" in the HIPAA Privacy Rule be expanded to include any person 
who stores or transmits individually identifiable electronic PHI for any 
business purpose related to the substance of the PHJ.l22 
B. Accessibility 
The HIPAA Privacy Rule allows patients access to their PHI.1"' Spe-
cifically, the regulations provide that "an inclividual has a right of access 
to inspect and obtain a copy of protected health information about the 
individual in a designated record set," with some exceptions, such as 
psychotherapy notes and information compiled for purposes of litiga-
ll715 u.s.c. §§ 6501(1). 6502 (2000). 
us For a critique of the privacy laws, see SOLOVE, rupra note 13, at 67-72. 
ll9 S. 1262, 109th Cong. (2005); see also Terry, supra note 13, at 138. 
'" S. 1262, 109th Cong. pmbl. 
121 !d. § 2907. 
122 See infra notesl98-212 and accompanying text. 
"' 45 C.F.R. § 164.524 (2006). 
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tion or administrative proceedings.J24 Furthermore, the Privacy Rule 
enables individuals to request amendment of PHI that is incorrect.125 
If the definition of "covered entity" is expanded to include any 
person who knowingly stores or transmits individually identifiable elec-
tronic Pill for any business purpose related to the substance of the 
Pill,l26 the right of access to inspect and obtain a copy of Pill should 
extend to all electronic Pill that is processed by any covered entity. In 
addition, the right to correct Pill should be similarly extended. Thus, if 
an employer127 or a bank obtains Pill in order to make employment or 
loan decisions, the individual who is the subject of that information 
should have a right of access to that data and a right to amend it if it is 
incorrect 
Furthermore, the right of access should be expanded to include a 
right to establish the provenance of the data and the purpose for which 
it is used. This approach has been utilized by the Fair Credit Reporting 
Act, which requires all consumer reporting agencies to disclose to con-
sumers, upon request, not only the information in the consumer's file, 
but also "the sources of the information. "128 In the case of health care 
providers, health plans, and many health care clearinghouses, the ori-
gins and purposes of the data will be obvious from the documents 
themselves, and thus, this requirement will add no burden to the cov-
ered entity. In the case of other parties, however, establishing the 
provenance and uses of the information could be essential to determin-
ing whether the Security Rule has been breached by any covered entity, 
by allowing the inappropriate dis~emination of PHI. Information con-
cerning the data's origins also will be necessary to ascertain whether 
criminal prosecution should be pursued, how widely the information 
has been distributed, and how much harm might be done to the indi-
vidual at issue. 
As discussed above, Pill is already commonly targeted by hack-
ers.129 It is not unrealistic to expect that a black market will develop for 
Pill to which businesses, marketers, blackmailers, and others could 
turn to purchase health information. According to one source, about 
124 Id. § J64.524(a) (1). 
125 Id. § 164.526-(a). The provision also specifies the conditions under which a request 
to amend records can be denied ld. · 
126 See supra notes 92-122 and accompanying text. 
127 See Americans with Disabilities Act ofl990, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d) (2000), for details 
concerning the obligations of employers with respect to medical information. 
l2B 15 U.S. C.§ 1681g(a) (1)-(2) (2000). 
129 See supra notes 5-23 and accompanying text. 
-- __ .1 
--.--... -. -... -. -- .-:--
I 
I 
I 
2007] Protecting Electronic Private Health Infonnation 349 
$10 billion in U.S. medical transcription business is outsourced to for-· 
eign countries.13° Foreign data processors of 'PHI are "business associ-
ates"131 of covered entities, and are bound by certain privacy protection 
requirements under the HIPAA regulations.l32 HHS has admitted, 
however, that it is unable to regulate effectively offshore business asso-
ciates or monitor their contracts with U.S. companies.1' 3 It is entirely 
possible that businesses or individuals processing PHI in distant loca-
tions, far from the direct reach of U.S. regulatory powers, will begin 
selling PHI to third parties who believe it offers opportunities for 
profit. 
Several databases already sell lists of persons suffering from a large 
number of ailments.I3< In addition, health care information companies 
sell individual physicians' prescribing records purchased from pharma-
cies to pharmaceutical companies that use them to market particular 
drugs to specific doctors.I35 
These lists are not necessarily compiled by illegal means. Rather, 
medical and other personal data can often be mined from purchase 
information, supermarket savings cards, surveys, sweepstakes and con-
test entries, U.S. Census records, credit card transactions, phone re-
cords, credit records, product warranty cards, or public records that are 
rightfully in the possession of those aggregating the information.I36 
Consequently, individuals are vulnerable to manipulation, exploitation, 
and discrimination by those who have access to their PHI. The patients, 
in turn, should, at the very least, be empowered to learn the origins 
and uses of PHI possessed by various parties. 
This disclosure approach is consistent with the one adopted by the 
E.U. Privacy Directive.l37 The Directive provides that each data subject 
I!IDTerry, supra note 13, at 164. 
tst 45 C.F.R § 160.103 (2006) (defining "business a.'isociates"). 
1!12 Id. § 164.504(e) (establishing standards for "business associate contracts"). The provi-
sion mandates that, with some exceptions, contracts between a covered entity and a business 
associate "may not authorize the business associate to use or further disclose the information 
in a manner that wouJd violate the requirements of this subpart, if done by the covered en-
tio/." Jd. 
1!19 Terry, supra note 13, at 165 (citing Letter from Tommy G. Thompson, Sec'y of 
Health & Human Sem., to Edward]. Markey, Representative, U.S. House of Representa-
tives (June 14, 2004)). 
134 See EJec. Privacy Info. Ctr., Privacy and Consumer Profiling, http:/ /www.epic.org/ 
privacy/profiling (last visited Feb. 23, 2007); see, <g., Hippo Direct, Medical and Healthcare 
List, http:/ /www.hippodirectcom/ListSubjectN_l.asp?ISubject-11 (last visited Feb. 23, 2007); 
Med. Mktg. Servs., Inc.. http:/ /www.mmslisiS.org/privacy/profiling (last visited Feb. 23, 2007). 
1!15 Stein brook, supra note 16, at 2745. 
136 Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., supra note 134. 
m See generally E.U. Privacy Directive, supra note 99. 
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may obtain "confirmation as to whether or not data relating to him are 
being processed and information at least as to the purposes of the proc-
essing," as well as the recipients, contents, and source of the data.138 The 
approach is also consistent with the Fair Information Practices (the 
"FIP") outlined in a report issued by the U.S. Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare in 1973.139 The FIP provide, in relevant part: 
• There must be a way for an individual to find out what informa-
tion about him is in a record and how it is used. 
• There must be a way for an individual to prevent information 
about him that was obtained for one purpose from being used or 
made available for other purposes without his consent. 
• Any organization creating, maintaining, using or disseminating 
records of identifiable personal data must ensure the reliability of 
the data for their intended use and must take precautions to pre-
vent misuse of the data.14o 
Under these principles, data subjects have a right to know how their 
Pill is used. They should also have a right to know the source of the in-
formation possessed by any party so that they can ensure that their in-
formation is not being misused or utilized for purposes for which it was 
not intended. In Part ill, Section B, we discuss mechanisms for allowing 
meaningful inquiry concerning the origins and uses of electronically 
stored Pill. 
C. Insufficient Compliance Guidelines 
The Security Rule leaves the mechanisms of implementing the out-
lined security standards to the discretion of the covered entity.141 Al-
though flexibility is often a desirable quality, it can also be hazardous in 
the regulatory context because it can leave those subject to regulation 
without sufficient guidance as to how to comply with legal require-
1
" E.U. Privacy Directive, supra note 99, art 12(a), 1995 OJ. (L 281) at 42. 
139 See generally DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 8ERVS., RECORDS, COMPUTERS AND THE 
RIGHTS OF CITIZENS: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S ADVISORY CoMMnTEE ON AUTOMATED 
PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS (1973), available at http:/ /aspe.hhs.gov/datacncl/1973privacy/ 
tocpre.fucemembers.htm. 
140 See generaUy id. The FIP have not been codified into any specific law in the United 
States, but rather, have served as the basis for some of the privacy laws discussed in this Arti-
cle. See Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, A Review of the Fair Information Principles: The Foun-
dation of Privacy Public Policy, http:/ /www.privacyrights.org/ar/fairinfo.htm (last visited 
Feb. 23, 2007). 
141 45 C.F.R § 164.306(b) (2006). 
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ments.142 In the context of the Security Rule, it is unrealistic to expect 
that every health care provider has the technical expertise and ability to 
determine on its own how to implement the security standards. 
Furthermore, some organizations could use the regulations' vague-
ness as a justification for establishing minimal PID security measures. It 
already appears that information technology is a low priority for the 
health care industry. As of 2002, only two to three percent of the indus-
try's funding was devoted to the electronic management of PID, com-
pared to ten to fifteen percent of funding devoted by other industries 
to advance information technology.J4ll Furthermore, the health care 
industry is "generally considered to be ten to fifteen years behind other 
industries with regard to security. "144 
A careful reading of just a few of the Security Rule's provisions il-
lustrates its characteristic weaknesses. In a provision entitled "Flexibility 
of approach," the Rule states, "Covered entities may use any security 
measures that allow the covered entity to reasonably and appropriately 
implement the standards and implementation specifications. "145 The 
regulations elaborate on the "reasonably and appropriately" standard 
only by instructing covered entities to take into account the entity's 
size, complexity, capabilities, and technical infrastructure; the security 
measures' costs; and the "probability and criticality of potential risks to 
electronic protected health information. "146 The above language does 
not define the term "criticality" and fuils to provide guidance concern-
ing how to identify "potential risks."147 
Likewise, in its "Administrative safeguards" section, the Security 
Rule requires covered entities to "[c]onduct an accurate and thorough 
assessment of the potential risks and vulnerabilities to the confidential-
ity, integrity, and availability of electronic protected health informa-
tion. "148 No further details are provided concerning how the complex 
task of risk analysis should be accomplished. 
142 Choi et al., supra note 2, at 62 (characterizing the HIPAA privacy regulations as a 
"loosely~worded document that is the current passing standard for privacy" and predicting 
that covered entities will experience difficulty "interpreting ex~ctly what l-DPAA security 
standards mean to their company and what exactly constitutes compliance"). 
14.'1 /d. 
14-1 Nancy A Lawson et al., The HIPAA Privacy Rule: An Overoiew cif Compliance Initiatives 
and Requirements, 70 DEF. CouNs.J.127, 147 (2003). 
14s 45 C.F.R § 164.306(b) (1). 
146 [d.§ 164.306(b) (2). 
147 See45 C.F.R § 164.306(b) (2) (2006). 
HB I d.§ 164.308(a) (1) (ii) (A). 
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In response to comments received during the proposed Rule's pub-
lic comment period, HHS explained: 
A thorough and accurate risk analysis would consider "all rele-
vant losses" that would be expected if the security measures 
were not in place. "Relevant losses" would include losses caused 
by unauthorized uses and disclosures and loss of data integrity 
that would be expected to occur absent the security measures.149 
This description, however, also lacks sufficient specificity. For example, 
· whose losses are to be considered-those suffered by the data subjects, 
by covered entities, ISO by business associates, or by other stakeholders? 
How direct or remote should the potential risks be in order to be con-
sidered? Unauthorized disclosure of PHI to various parties can affect 
insurance coverage, job prospects, family dynamics, and even social op-
portunities.I51 Should all of these potential consequences be contem-
plated? 
If covered entities are to maintain discretion under the Security 
Rule's flexible approach, !52 the key to ensuring that they choose effec-
tive security measures is a requirement that they implement rigorous 
risk analysis and management processes. These processes should iden-
t:i:ly, analyze, and mitigate the particular risks associated with health in-
formation disclosure for various stakeholders, and especially for data 
subjects. The Security Rule fuils to provide sufficient guidance for the 
development of such measures. 
Besides exhibiting a low level of specificity in its security standards,· 
the Security Rule entirely fails to address certain important issues. The 
Security Rule omits an explicit requirement that covered entities, per-
haps with the assistance of consultants or vendors,153 identify the rele-
vant best current securit:y practices of the health informatics and computer 
security communities. Such a requirement is needed to ensure that 
covered entities are knowledgeable about sound security practices and 
"' Health Insurance Reform: Security Standards, 68 Fed. Reg. 8334, 8347 (Feb. 20, 
2003). 
tsn In this response, HFIS emphasized the potential losses that could be suffered by a 
covered entity: "A covered entity that lacks adequate protections risks inadvertent disclo-
sure of patient data, with resulting loss of public trust, and potential legal action." Id. at 
8344. It is unclear why HHS did not focus on other parties that bear significant risks as 
well. 
151 See supra notes 14-23 and accompanying text. 
m 45 C.F.R § 164.306(b) (1). 
tss See infra notes 268--292 and accompanying text (discussing the services of security 
product vendors). 
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emergent security risks and their countermeasures. The rapid exploita-
tion of newly discovered vulnerabilities in software systems and applica-
tions by attackers makes it essential that covered entities be extremely 
diligent in learning about and responding to vulnerabilities. Covered 
entities or their agents should utilize the substantial amount of relevant 
information that is provided by reputable organizations such as the In-
ternational Organization for Standardization ("ISO"), the Computer 
Emergency Response Team ("CERT"), the National Institute of Stan-
dards and Technology ( ''NIST"), the National Information Assurance 
Partnership (''NIAP"), and software vendors. 1M 
Another crucial omission from the Security Rule is guidance con-
cerning the risks inherent in the development, operation, and mainte-
nance of the computer software that provides the functionality of sys-
tems that process electronic PID. Such software is often extremely 
complex, comprising many thousands or millions of program instruc-
tions, most of which are executed only under particular conditions. Er-
rors in software development are virtually inevitable. Any software de-
fect, such as a missing or erroneous sequence of instructions, becomes 
a security vulnerability if an attacker can exploit it to his or her benefit 
and to the detriment of system stakeholders. Moreover, mistakes in the 
configuration and operation of software easily can render it insecure, 155 
as can errors made during software maintenance,156 the process of 
modifying software to correct defects or to enhance its functionality. 
Thus, covered entities should be required to consider the risks as-
sociated with software as part of their risk analysis process and to follow 
best current practices for software development, validation, operation, 
and maintenance. These risks include, among others: incorrect func-
tionality resulting in erroneous output, missing functionality, poor "us-
ability," poor documentation, "crashes" and other critical failures, and 
excessive costs and delays in development leading to reduced emphasis 
on product quality and security.157 All of these risks can adversely affect 
the security of electronic private health information. 
154 See infra notes 269-318 and accompanying text. 
155 SANS Inst, The Top 20 Most Critical Internet Security Vulnerabilities (Updated)-
The Experts Consensus, http:/ /www.sans.org/top20/2005 (last visited Feb. 23, 2007). 
156 STEPHEN R SGHACH, OBJECT-ORIENTED AND CLASSICAL SOFTWARE ENGINEERING 
7-13, 479-96 (6th ed. 2005). 
. 157 See id.; see also PETER G. NEUMANN, SRI lNT'L, ILLUSTRATIVE RISKS TO THE PUBLIC 
IN THE USE OF CoMPUTER SYSTEMS AND RELATED 'TECHNOLOGY (2007), available at ftp:/ / 
ftp.csl.sri.com/pub/users/neumann/illustrative.pdf. 
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If compliance with the Security Rule's standards is not to be a 
sham, the Rule's standards and implementation specifications must be 
augmented, and covered entities must receive further guidance as to 
how to achieve their obligations. Section C of Part III develops recom-
mendations fur elucidating the Security Rule's requirements and facili-
tating compliance through instruments that limit the costs and burdens 
it places upon covered entities.l5B 
D. Private Cause of Action 
The HIPAA Security Rule does not provide for a private cause of 
action.159 Rather, enforcement is achieved through administrative pro-
cedures and hearings before an ALJ.160 It is noteworthy that under the 
Clinton Administration, the HHS Secretary's recommendations to 
Congress included a proposal for a private right of action, but Congress 
ultimately rejected this approach.161 
Under the enforcement system established by the regulations, any 
aggrieved individual has a right to file a complaint with the HHS Secre-
tary.162 At his or her discretion, the Secretary may investigate the com-
plaint.163 If a violation is found, the Secretary is to impose a penalty on 
the offender164 and collect the money, 165 but no damages are available 
for persons who are aggrieved or injured by the privacy lapse. At the 
request of the covered entity, a hearing may be held before an ALJ, but 
the only parties to participate are the respondent and HHS personnel.! 56 
By contrast to the HIPAA Privacy Rule, many other American pri-
vacy laws establish a private cause of action.J67 These laws provide ex-
tsa See infra notes 244-318 and accompanying text. 
159 See 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.30G-.552 (2006); Winn, supra note 39, at 618. 
160 See45 C.F.R. §§ 160.30G-.552; Winn, supra note 39, at 618. 
161 Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., Recommendations Pursuant to Section 264 of 
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 {Sept. 11, 1997), available 
at http:/ /www.aspe.hhs.gov/admnsimp/pvcrec.htm ("Any individual whose rights under 
the law have been violated, whether negligently or knowingly, should be permitted to 
bring an action for actual damages and equitable relief. For knowing violation attorney's 
fees and punitive damages also should be available."). 
162 45 C.F.R. § 160.306(a); see also U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Office for 
Civil Rights-HIPAA. Medical Privacy-National Standards to Protect the Privacy of Per-
sonal Health Information, http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/hipaa (last visited Feb. 23, 2007) (list-
ing information concerning the filing of complaints and other matters). 
16
' 45 C.F.R. § 160.306(c). 
164 Id. § 160.402(a). 
165 45 C.F.R. § 160.424(a) (2006). 
166 Id. § 160.504(a). 
167 See Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g) (2000) (stating that individuals may bring 
civil actions against noncompliant agencies for injunctive relief or for damages up to $1000 
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plicitly for a right to recover attorney's fees and costs so that even plain-
tiffs with minimal damages resulting from inappropriate disclosure are 
likely to find attorneys willing to litigate their cases. Like these laws, the 
E. U. Privacy Directive supports the notion of private litigation and man-
dates that "Member States shall provide for the right of every person to 
a judicial remedy for any breach of the rights" embodied in the state's 
applicable privacy law.16B 
We recommend that the HIPAA Security Rule's enforcement pro-
visions, which apply to the entirety of the HIPAA privacy regulations, 169 
be revised to include a private cause of action. Further details concern-
ing suggested procedures and remedies are discussed in Part ID.17° At 
this point, however, because covered entities surely would object to the 
prospect of costly and onerous private litigation, it is appropriate to jus-
tify our recommendation and analyze the contributions a private cause 
of action could make to PHI security. 
If the HIPAA privacy regulations are intended to protect data sub-
jects, they must provide access to a remedy when individuals' rights are 
violated and must not leave victims out of the enforcement process. 
The HIPAA regulations provide little satisfaction for aggrieved persons 
and discount their potential injuries by fu.iling to include them in en-
forcement proceedings and provide them with a personal remedy. 
Moreover, private litigation is often needed as an adjunct to ad-
ministrative procedures for deterrence purposes. Aggressive pursuit of 
governmental enforcement actions may depend upon political priori-
in cases of intentional or willful violations, as well as attorney's fees and costs); Electronic 
Communications Privacy Ac~ 18 U.S. C. § 2520 (2000) (stating that "any person whose wire, 
oral, or electronic communication is intercepted, disclosed, or intentionally used in violation 
of this chapter may in a civil action recover from the person· or entity which engaged in that 
violation such relief as may be appropriate," including actual damages, ptmitive damages, 
attorney's fees, and costs); Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710(c) (2000) 
(allowing aggrieved persons to bring civil actions for actual damages, punitive damages, rea-
sonable attorney's fees and costs, and equitable relief); Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 
1994, 18 U.S.C. § 2724 (2000) (establishing that a ''person who knowingly obtains, discloses 
or uses personal information, from a motor vehicle record" for an impermissible purpose will 
be liable to the individual at issue for actual damages, punitive damages, reasonable attor-
ney's fees and costs, and equitable relief); Cable Communications Policy Act, 47 U.S.C. 
§ 551 (f) (1) (2000) (providing that "(a]ny person aggrieved by any act of a cable operator in 
violation of this section may bring a civil action" in a U.S. district court for actual damages, 
punitive damages, attorney's fees, and costs). · 
'" E.U. Privacy Directive, supra note 99, arL 22, 1995 OJ. (L 281) at45. 
169 HIPAA Administrative Simplification: Enforcement, 71 Fed. Reg. 8390, 8390 (Feb. 
16, 2006) (stating that the regulation's enforcement provisions now apply "to all of the 
HIPAAAdministrative Simplification rules"). 
17D See infra notes 319-333 and accompanying text 
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ties and pressures, such as the degree to which a case is perceived as 
advancing the general public interest171 or budgetary and other re-
source allocation constraints.l72 Thus, clear violations that affect only a 
single person could be ignored, and cases that would not set important 
precedents might not be litigated by the government no matter how 
justified prosecution would be. Such inevitable resource-rationing deci-
sions can leave a significant deterrence void, which can only be filled 
through private enforcement. 
Private litigation features several important advantages over admin-
istrative proceedings. It can effectively restrict unlawful conduct through 
the threat of costly and well-publicized court proceedings, and it can 
often resolve cases more quickly than administrative enforcement han-
dled by overburdened agencies.l73 Furthermore, careful judicial review 
that produces published opinions can serve an important rule-making 
function by setting precedents that interpret vague language in adminis-
trative regulations.'74 Cases that capture media attention, as some Jaw-
suits do, have the added advantage of educating members of the public 
at large concerning their rights and obligations under the law.175 By 
contrast, although HIPAA mandates that ALJs issue decisions containing 
findings of fuct and conclusions of Jaw, the decisions are issued only to 
the parties and are unlikely to be published in any widely accessible 
format. 176 
In fuct, HHS already has been criticized for grossly deficient en-
forcement of the HIPAA Privacy Rule.177 Between April 14, 2003 and 
June of 2006, HHS received 19,420 complaints concerning privacy via-
171 See Arthur Best. Monetary Damages for False Advertising, 49 U. PITT. L. REv. 1, 40 
(1987) (explaining that "[p]rivate suits do not have to pass a public interest test"). 
172 See Ann J. Gellis, MandatOry Disclnsure for Munir:zpal Securities: Issues in Implementation, 
13 J. CORP. L. 65, 86 (1987) (stating that "reliance on public proceedings as the prime 
means of enforcement is subject to the direct political restraints of budget resources and 
indirect political pressures regarding how those resources are directed"). 
17!1 See Best, supra note 171, at 40. 
174 See Gellis, supra note 172, at 81 (discussing judicial rule-making functions). 
175 See 45 C.F.R § 160.426 (2006). If the Secretary imposes a fine on a covered entity, 
the Secretary is to notify the public "in such manner as the Secretary deems appropriate." 
/d. The Secretary is given no instructions, however, as to which media outlets to utilize, and 
it is uncertain whether a mere statement concerning the imposition of a penalty will gen-
erate the kind of extensive media interest that courtroom drama seems to produce. 
176 See id. § 160.546(a), (c). 
177 See Peter P. Swire, justice Department Opinion Undermines Protection of Medical Privacy, 
CENTER FOR AM. PROGRESS, june 7, 2005, http:/ /www.americanprogress.org/issues/2005/ 
06/b74328!.html. 
! 
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lations.178 No civil fine has been imposed,179 however, and as of June of 
2006, only two criminal actions had been brought under HIPAA's 
criminal enforcement provision.180 One case prosecuted a hospital 
phlebotomist who accessed the medical records of a terminal cancer 
patient in Seattle and obtained credit cards in his name,1B1 and the 
other resulted in the conviction of a Texas woman who sold the medi-
cal records of an FBI agent.JB2 
One might argue that several causes of action relating to privacy 
violations already exist in tort law, rendering a statutory private cause of 
action under HIPAA unnecessary. The tort of public disclosure of pri-
vate facts consists of four elements: (1) public disclosure, (2) of a pri-
vate fuct, (3) that would be objectionable and offensive to a reasonable 
person, and ( 4) that is not oflegitimate public concem.183 Most courts 
have found that to support this theory of liability, plaintiffs must prove 
widespread dissemination of personal information to the public1B4 and 
have deemed this tort theory to fit mostly cases involving publication 
through the media.185 In the context of HIPAA violations, however, PHI 
I7a Rob Stein, Medical Privacy Law Nets No Fines: Lax Enforcement Puts Patients' Files at 
Risk, Critics Say, WASH. PosT, june 5, 2006, at AI. The regulations went into effect on April 
14, 2003. 45 C.F.R § 164.534. 
179 Stein, supra note 178. 
tao Id. The criminal enforcement provision is found at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d~6 (2000), 
IBI Swire, supra note 177. The defendant had charged over $9000 on the credit card 
largely for video game purchases. !d. He pled guilty and was sentenced to sixteen months 
in prison. Id. 
IB2 Stein, supra note 178. 
'"See Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 765, 767-68 (Ct App. 1983) (not-
ing that jury found defendant liable for publicizing fact that plaintiff had gender correc-
tive surgery, but overturning award based on erroneous jury instructions). There are three 
other kinds of invasion of privacy torts, none of which are likely to be relevant in the case 
of Pill disclosures-intrusion on seclusion, appropriation of name/likeness, and placing 
someone in a false light. &eRESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 652A (1977). 
184 Winn, supra note 39, at 653; see Satterfield v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 617 F. 
Supp. 1359, 1370 (D.S.C. 1985) (stating that "[c]omrnunication to a single individual or to 
a small group of people" will not support liability under a theory of public disclosure of 
private facts, which requires publicity rather than publication to a small group of people); 
Beard v. Akzona. Inc., 517 F. Supp. 128, 132 (E.D. Tenn. 1981) (emphasizing that publica-
tion to a small number of people will not create liability); Tollefson v~ Price, 430 P.2d 990, 
992 (Or. 1967) (stating that public disclosure occurs only when the information is com-
municated to the public generally or to a large number of people); Vogel v. W. T. Grant 
Co., 327 A2d 133, 137 (Pa. 1974) (explaining that the tort is established only if disclosure 
is made to the public at large or the information is certain to become public knowledge); 
Swinton Creek Nursery v. Edisto Farm Credit, 514 S.E.2d 126, 131 (S.C. 1999) (stating that 
"publicity, as opposed to mere publication, is what is required to give rise to a cause of 
action for this branch of invasion of privacy"). 
tss SOLOVE, supra note 13, at 59-60 (explaining that this tort "appears to be designed 
to redress excesses of the press"). 
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generally will be delivered to particular interested parties, such as drug 
representatives, employers, or individuals with criminal intent, rather 
than to the general public, and thus, the tort of public disclosure of pri-
vate facts will be inapplicable. 
A more fruitful tort theory for plaintiffs might be breach of confi-
dentiality.186 Courts have based the patient's right of confidentiality 
upon a variety of sources, including privilege statutes protecting physi-
cian-patient communications, licensing statutes prohibiting the disclo-
sure of patient information without authorization, and medical ethics 
principles articulated in the Hippocratic Oath and other sources.I87 In 
HrYme v. Patton in 1973, for example, the Alabama Supreme Court held 
that a physician breached his duty of confidentiality by disclosing medi-
cal information to the patient's employer.!•• The court ruled that a 
doctor has a duty not to disclose patient information obtained in the 
course of treatment and that a private cause of action exists in cases 
where the duty is breached.189 An action for breach of confidentiality 
can be maintained regardless of the degree to which the information 
has been publicly distributed, and there is no requirement to prove the 
intent of the perpetrator.I90 
Nevertheless, in general, the tort of breach of confidentiality can 
be established only when the perpetrator and the victim of the breach 
of confidentiality had a direct relationship.l91 Plaintiffs have also occa-
sionally prevailed against third parties who knowingly induced physi-
cians to reveal confidential information in violation of physician-patient 
confidentiality responsibilities, but here too, the improper disclosure 
was made by the doctor.J92 In addition, because breach of confidential-
186 Sec Winn, supra note 39, at 652-58 (discussing the common law tort theory of 
breach of confidentiality and its implications). 
167 Id. at 654-55. 
188 287 So. 2d 824,829-30 (Ala. 1973). 
1B9 Id. 
190 Winn, supra note 39, at 657-58 (comparing the torts of invasion of privacy and 
breach of confidentiality). 
191 Id. at 662; see Humphers v. First Interstate Bank, 696 P.2d 527, 527-28, 530, 536 (Or. 
1985) (finding that a mother who had given her daughter up for adoption had a cause of 
action for breach of confidentiality against a doctor who helped her daughter discover her 
mother's identity and explaining that "only one who holds the information in confidence 
can be charged with a breach of confidence"). 
192 Wfnn, supra note 39, at 661-65; see Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 243 
F. Supp. 793, 795 {N.D. Ohio 1965) {suit brought against a physician's malpractice insurer 
that had induced the physician to disclose the patient's confidential medical records when 
no malpractice case was pending); Alberts v. Devine, 479 N.E.2d 113, 116 (Mass. 1985) 
(suit brought against individuals who obtained information from the plaintiff's psychiatrist 
and used it to make an adverse employment decision); Biddle v. Warren Gen. Hasp., 715 
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ity is a common law tort, the standard for establishing liability can vary 
from state to state.193 
The breach of confidentiality tort, therefore, will not extend to 
cases in which insurers or clearinghouses, rather than physicians or 
hospitals, legitimately possess PHI and disclose it to third parties who 
are not entitled to the data. Similarly, if the definition of "covered enti-
ties" is extended to encompass a large variety of parties in possession of 
PHI, the breach of confidentiality tort will not apply to disclosures 
made by employers, data miners, and others who obtained PHI by 
means other than physician disclosure. 
Consequently, a statutory cause of action is needed to capture the 
many privacy threats that do not fit within the narrow bounds of com-
mon law causes of action. A federal statutory cause of action with ex-
plicit guidelines regarding damages will diminish inequities and incon-
sistencies in case outcomes. 
Ill. RECOMMENDATIONS 
In this Part, we provide four primary recommendations to enhance 
the efficacy of the Security Rule in particular, and to some extent, the 
Privacy Rule in general. These include: (1) expanding the scope of the 
HIPAA Privacy Rule through revision of the definitions of "covered en-
tity" and ''health information"; (2) enabling individuals to receive in-
formation concerning the provenance and uses of their PHI; (3) bol-
stering existing standards and implementation specifications, and pro-
viding covered entities with guidance and meclianisms that will facilitate 
compliance wiili ilie Security Rule's requirements; and ( 4) establishing 
a private cause of action for aggrieved individuals.194 Our recommenda-
tions are designed to create fixed regulations that are workable in ilie 
dynamic and ever-changing realms of computer technology and security 
vulnerabilities. They also seek to balance patients' needs for privacy pro-
tection against businesses' needs to operate efficiently and profitably. 
We have carefully crafted our definitions to avoid creating unrealistic 
burdens for iliose who cannot bear iliem. We also have considered ilie 
N.E.2d 518, 520 (Ohio 1999) (involving a law firm that induced a hospital to allow it to 
review all patient files to determine whether the patients were eligible for Supplemental 
Security Insurance Disability benefits, and thus, presumably, might wish to utilize the law 
firm's services); Morris v. Consolidation Coal Co., 446 S.E.2d 648, 649-50 (W.Va. 1994) 
(involving an employer who inappropriately obtained information from a physician who 
treated the plaintiff for injuries for which he claimed workers' compensation). 
193 See sources cited supra note 192. 
I!H See infra notes 195-333 and accompanying text 
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implications of our proposals in a variety of circumstances, which we 
illustrate through detailed examples. 
A Expanding the Regulatory Scope 
In order to expand the scope of the Privacy and Security Rules, 
two regulatory definitions must be altered. The terms at issue are "cov-
ered entity" and "health information." This Section will formulate rec-
ommendations for revisions of the definitions,195 discuss the changes' 
impact on the Privacy Rule's "uses and disclosures" provision,196 and 
critique alternative approaches to the suggested changes.197 
1. Covered Entities 
Because health care providers, insurers, and clearinghouses are by 
no means the only entities to maintain and transmit PHI, it is illogical 
to limit the jurisdiction of the Security Rule in particular and the pri-
vacy regulations in general to these three types of entities.198 The threat 
to electronic PHI reaches fur beyond the health care field because a 
variety of parties, such as marketers, blackmailers, and anyone with a. 
stake in an individual's financial future, might be interested in obtain-
ing health information.I99 
Consequently, the term "covered entity" in the HIPAA Privacy 
Rule200 should be expanded to include a fourth component, namely, 
"any person who knowingly stores or transmits individually identifiable 
health information in electronic form for any business purpose related 
to the substance of such information." At the same time, some of the 
Privacy Rule's "Applicability" sections2°1 and the "Applicability" provi-
sion of the HIPAA legislation itse!f2°2 would need to be revised to add 
the above-described fourth covered category. 
The term "Person" is defined in the privacy regulations as "a natu-
ral person, trust or estate, partnership, corporation, professional asso-
. dation or corporation, or other entity, public or private. "203 The term 
'
95 See infra notes 198-223 and accompanying text 
196 See infra notes 224-235 and accompanying text. 
197 See infra notes 236-238 and accompanying text 
198 See supra nates 92-121 and accompanying text 
199 See supra notes 5-23, 92-121 and accompanying text 
200 See 45 C.F.R § 160.103 (2006) (providing the current definition). 
'" Id. §§ 160.102, 164.104. 
202 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-1 (a) (2000). 
2
" 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 . 
- •• -~--- _ _j 
. -- --- ----- ----.~·.-.---. --- --- -------~-,---:--~~--, 
' 
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"business" should be defined as an "activity or enterprise undertaken 
for purposes of livelihood or profit.''2°4 
Admittedly, limiting the scope of regulatory coverage to those who 
utilize Pill for business purposes related to the substance of the Pill 
will result in the persistence of some sigoificant security threats. For 
example, volunteers associated with religious organizations might col-
lect and electronically store large volumes of information about com-
munity members who have been hospitalized or have disabilities for 
purposes of providing them with assistance. If this data is not secured 
through adequate computer technology and security practices, it could 
be inadvertently or deliberately disseminated to unwanted sources. Yet, 
this volunteer activity could not be defined as "business" under the 
proposed revision and would not be addressed by the Privacy Rule. 
Nevertheless, it is inadvisable to extend the regulations beyond this 
suggested revision because doing so, ironically, could result in in-
creased governmental invasion of privacy rather than enhanced privacy 
protection. To illustrate, a definition of "covered entity" that included 
any person who handled electronic Pill for any reason whatsoever 
would capture private citizens who e-mailed each other about a friend's 
medical problem. These individuals would be required to purchase 
costly security technology for their computers and be subject to penal-
ties for disseminating news of the illness to third parties without the 
data subject's consent. Such a rule would constitute unwarranted gov-
ernment intrusion into purely private matters. 
Application of the privacy regulations to volunteer activities also 
would be undesirable because the cost of compliance and the threat of 
liability might deter engagement in charitable work and, therefore, 
hurt rather than promote the interests of those who are sick or have 
disabilities. It also should be recalled that several relevant causes of ac-
tion exist under tort theories, such as public disclosure of private facts 
and breach of confidentiality.2°5 Thus, disclosures of private health in-
formation by parties not covered by the Privacy Rule's revised defini-
tion could, in appropriate circumstances, be addressed through tort 
law, if they cause ~ury to the data subject. 206 
Furthermore, limiting covered entities to those that knowingly 
process individually identifiable health information in electronic form 
for any business purpose related to the substance of such information 
204 Cf. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 171 (1911) {providing similar defmition); 
BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 211 (8th ed. 2004) (same). 
!!05 See supra notes 183-193 and accompanying text. 
20ii See supra notes 183-193 and accompanying text. 
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addresses the fact that some parties might unintentionally and inadver-
tently come to possess health information. For example, a photo shop 
that develops pictures from digital cameras could handle pictures re-
vealing scars and physical impairments or memorializing hospitaliza-
tions, births, and otherhealth-related events. These might be stored for 
a time on the business's computer even though no employee specifi-
cally knows of their existence or uses them for any purpose relating to 
health and medicine. It would be excessive and impolitic to burden all 
photo shops with the requirements of the Security Rule and other pri-
vacy regulations based on the possibility that some of the pictures they 
develop will contain medical data. 
The final qualification of the definition, which restricts covered 
entities to those that process PHI for any business purpose related to the 
substance of such information, aims to exclude those who might come to 
handle some form of PHI in the course of their business but who do 
not actually use the contents of the information. Thus, the photo shop 
described above would be excluded from coverage not only for the rea-
sons already discussed, but also because it does not utilize the contents 
of health information concerning individuals for any business purpose. 
To illustrate further, a small "mom and pop" store might sell over-
the-counter medications along with food and other items. If a customer 
pays by credit card, these drugs might be scanned for payment pur-
poses and associated with the customer's credit card number in elec-
tronic transaction records. The store operators, however, would retain 
the information only for purposes of credit card records and would not 
utilize specific information concerning the customer's health-related 
purchases for any business purpose.2°7 It would be inappropriate to re-
quire the mom and pop store to comply with the HIPAA privacy regula-
tions' requirements based solely on its sale of pain relief or cold medi-
cations. 
By contrast, pharmacies selling prescription drugs that are labeled 
with the patient's name and doctor's instructions have far more exten-
sive information about patients, including the names of their doctors, 
histories of their prescription drug purchases, and other details, which 
they utilize for purposes of refills and identifying repeat customers who 
fill new prescriptions. Drug stores are thus justifiably covered entities.2°8 
!!117 If, however, the store operators wished to sell individually identifiable information 
about the purchase of health products to third parties and thereby profit from its process-. 
ing, they would become covered entities. 
:!OB SeeSOLOVE, supra note 13, at 208. 
.~----- ·~-~-···--··-··--··-
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Under the proposed definition, most if not all "business associates" 
also will become covered entities because they are hired specifically to 
process PHI.209 This coverage is consistent with the existing regulations, 
which state that a "covered entity may be a business associate of another 
covered entity" and will provide reinforced protection to data sub-
jects. ' 10 Business associates will not only be bound by the terms of their 
contracts with other covered entities, which are governed by the HIPAA 
Privacy Rule, 211 but also will be themselves subject to all of the Privacy 
Rule's provisions, HHS investigations and administrative enforcement 
actions,212 and private litigation in case of statutory violations. 
2. Health Information 
The recommended expansion of the definition of "covered entity" 
will necessitate a parallel expansion of the meaning of "health informa-
tion," which is found in the privacy regulations' definition section'1' as 
well as in HIPAA's statutory definition section.214 ''Health information" 
currendy means: 
[A]ny information, whether oral or recorded in any form or 
medium, that: 
(A) is created or received by a health care provider, health 
plan, public health authority, employer, life insurer, school or 
university, or health care clearinghouse; and 
(B) relates to the past, present, or future physical or mental 
health or condition of an individual, the provision of health 
care to an individual, or the past, present, or future payment 
for the provision of health care to an individual.215 
This definition excludes PHI that is provided by individuals without 
the involvement of a health professional and is handled by financial 
'"' See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2006) (defining "business associate"); see a~a id. § 164.314 
(stating contractual requirements relating to the proceSsing of PHI by business associates). 
Under the contracrual terms demanded by 45 C.F.R. § 164.314, it would be very difficult 
for a business associate to claim that it did not know it was processing PID and thus escape 
IDPAA responsibilities. To avoid any ambiguity, however, covered entities should slate ex-
plicitly in their contracts that they are hiring business associates to process PHI. 
210 Seeid. § 160.103. 
mId.§ 164.314 (articulating the standard for business associate contracts). 
212 See id. §§ 160.500-.552. Unfortunately, business associates in foreign countries are 
likely to be beyond the reach ofHHS enforcement. 
m JrL § 160.103. 
214 42 u.s.c. § 1320d(4) (2000). 
!!15 Jd. 
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institutions, marketers, website operators, and many other parties with 
an interest in individuals' electronic PHJ.216 
A more appropriate definition can be derived from the proposed 
Health Technology to Enhance Quality Act of 2005,217 discussed previ-
ously. 218 This bill defines ''health information" to mean "any informa-
tion, recorded in any form or medium, that relates to the past, present, 
or future physical or mental health or condition of an individual, the 
provision of health care to an individual, or the past, present, or future 
payment for the provision of healthcare to an individual."219 This lan-
guage does not limit ''health information" based on who its creator or 
recipient was. 
Although this definition is quite broad, it should be qualified to 
require a clear association between data and the physical or mental 
health status of a particular individual. Recall the above example of a 
grocery store selling nonprescription medication, vitamins, or dietary 
supplements.22° Do records of purchases of such items constitute 
"health information"? On the one hand, data miners may be able to 
infer the existence of particular diseases from a series of seemingly un-
related purchases.221 On the other hand, many substances can be util-
ized for a broad spectrum of conditions, ranging from a headache to 
post-surgical care, and many items are bought for use by persons other 
than the purchaser. The fu.ct of the sale does not clearly reveal specific 
information concerning a particular individual's health status. Conse-
quently, records of sales of nonprescription health-related goods should 
not be covered by HIPM even if they are maintained in electronic 
form.222 We therefore recommend that "health information" be de-
fined as "any information, recorded in any form or medium, that 
clearly relates to the past, present, or future physical or mental health 
or condition of an individual, the provision of healthcare to an individ-
ual, or the past, present, or future payment for the provision of health-
care to an individual." 
Because we cannot anticipate every circumstance that will arise 
and require interpretation of the regulatory standards, we cannot pro-
216 See id. 
m SeeS. 1262, 109th Cong. (2005). 
21a See supra notes 119-121 and accompanying texL 
'" 5.1262 § 2901(3). 
!!l!O See supra note 207 and accompanying text. 
221 Buying a combination of high calorie dietary supplements, pain medication, and 
particular vitamins could indicate that an individual has AIDS or cancer. 
222 PHI that is inferred by data miners from such records and used for business pur-
poses would, however, be covered under our definition. 
r 
' L---~---'-----~~----
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vide comprehensive guidance conceming the meaning of "health in-
formation" in every hypothetical instance. Further elucidation of the 
Privacy Rule's requirements will be achieved over time through further 
guidance by HHS and the courts in response to specific controver-
sies.223 
3. Uses and Disclosures 
The new definition of "covered entity" would render all of the pri-
vacy regulations' provisions applicable to anyone who knowingly trans-
mits or maintains electronic PHI for any business purpose related to 
the substance of the PHI. A particularly significant section of the Pri-
vacy Rule is the "uses and disclosures" provision, 224 which prohibits the 
utilization and dissemination of PHI without the patient's consent ex-
cept in specific circumstances that generally relate to medical treatment 
or obligations established by law.225 With an expanded definition of 
"covered entity," this provision would have a dramatically greater im-
pact because it would constrain many more parties handling PHI. This 
consequence is a salutary development that wm provide much more 
meaningful protection for individually identifiable health information. 
Employers, life insurers, marketers, retailers, and others could not use 
PHI or disclose it to third parties without obtaining the consent of the 
data subjects. 
The required contents of covered entities' notice of privacy prac-
tices, including use and disclosures, are specified in the federal regula-
tions. 226 The regulations also require that each authorization be signed 
and dated by the data subject.227 The regulations, however, do not in-
struct covered entities to alert data subjects that a risk of unauthorized 
disclosure will exist no matter what security measures are implemented. 
Because awareness of the risk could be essential to individuals' decision 
making and provision of meaningful consent, we recommend that the 
regulatory notice provision be amended to require that covered entities 
include a statement in their patient consent forms such as, "despite our 
efforts to safeguard your privacy, a risk remains that your electronically 
stored PHI will be disclosed without authorization because of an unan-
m See infra notes 233--235 and accompanying text (discussing means of contacting 
HHS). 
"'' 45 C.F.R § 164.502 (2006). 
"'!d.§§ 164.502(a), .512. 
"' I d. § 164.520 (b). 
"'!d.§ 164.508(c) (1) (vi). 
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ticipated security failure. "22B Individuals who sign an authorization con-
taining this statement will be empowered to conduct their own risk 
analysis and to make a more educated decision about consent. 
The expanded prohibition will adversely affect marketing229 and 
data mining operations, but it will not eradicate them. Covered entities 
that wish to sell Pill would have to obtain consent from those whose 
data is disclosed,230 but this may willingly be given if the request is care-
fully worded. For example, many individuals might provide authoriza-
tion if they are told that their information "will be used to identifY 
products that will better fit your needs." Data miners that garner in-
formation from sources other than the person to which it relates would 
likewise need to obtain consent for every sale of their lists. To simplify 
matters, a "do not market list," similar to the "national do not call list" 
that relates to phone solicitations, could be constructed. 
The Privacy Rule details numerous exceptions to the use and disclo-
sure prohibition, all of which would apply to the newly covered enti-
ties.m These exemptions include, among others, uses and disclosures 
without consent that are: (1) required by law; (2) necessary for public 
health activities; (3) related to victims of abuse, neglect, or domestic vio-
lence; ( 4) required for purposes of health oversight activities; (5) ne-
cessary for judicial and administrative proceedings; (6) required for 
law enforcement purposes; (7) necessary to avert a serious threat to 
health or safety; or (8) needed for specialized government functions.232 
226 Unfortunately, covered entities will not be able to quantify the risk. such as by stat-
ing that the risk is one in a hundred or a thousand. 
229 See 45 C.F.R § 164.508(a) (3) (establishing that covered entities must obtain con-
sent for any use or disclosure of PI-ll for marketing purposes with very limited exceptions). 
2!10 CJ. Parliament and Council Directive 2002/58/EC, Concerning the Processing of 
Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector, 
2002 OJ. (L 201) 37, 41-42 (stating that "[i]f the party collecting the data from the sub-
scriber or any third party to whom the data have been transmitted wishes to use the data 
for an additional purpose, the renewed consent of the subscriber is to be obtained" and 
that "[w]hen electronic contact details are obl:ained, the customer should be informed 
about their further use for direct marketing in a clear and distinct manner, and be given 
the opportunity to refuse such usage"). 
'" See45 C.F.R. §§ 164.502, .512 (2006) (detailing currently permitted uses and disclo-
sures}. 
2!2 Id. § 164.512. By comparison, the E.U. Privacy Directive, which applies to all entities 
processing numerous categories of data. allows the processing of private information under 
the following circumstances: (1) the data subject has consented to the processing; (2) proc-
essing is necessary for purposes of employment law; (3) the data subject is unable to provide 
authorization and processing is necessary to protect the vital interests of the individual in 
question or a third party; (4) processing is done by a foundation, association, or other nonM 
profit-seeking body for its own purposes, and no data is disclosed to third parties without 
consent; (5) the data is made public by its subject or is necessary for purposes of a legal 
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It is possible that the expansion of the "covered entities" definition 
will necessitate other unanticipated exceptions. These may be identi-
fied through public input provided during the notice and comment 
period that would follow the proposal of the amendments delineated 
in this Article. 233 
In addition, the HHS website establishes an avenue for commu-
nicating with the agency concerning comments and questions.234 Spe-
cifically, it provides: 
[Y] ou may submit an e-mail by clicking on the mailbox 
(OCRPrivacy@hhs.gov). Individual responses w:ill not be pro-
vided, however, we will address concerns of general interest 
through development of new FAQs or other guidance for in-
clusion on our web site. As an alternative, you may call the 
HIPAA toll-free number at (866) 627-7748.235 
Thus, inquiries could be submitted to HHS concerning the permissibil-
ity of particular uses and disclosures, whether certain data constitutes 
"health information," and other matters requiring clarification. 
4. Alternatives to Revising the Privacy Rule 
An alternative approach to modifying the HIPAA Privacy Rule 
would be to amend individually a large number of laws that govern 
actors who might pose a threat to medical privacy. For example, the 
Americans with Disabilities Act places boundaries upon the timing, 
content, and use of employer-conducted medical inquiries and ex-
aminations. 236 It does not, however, address the permissibility of ac-
quiring medical data from third parties or the security measures that 
must be applied to any health records possessed by employers.2S7 This 
claim; or (6) processing is required for medical reasons. E.U. Privacy Directive, supra note 99, 
art 8, 1995 OJ. (L 281) at 40; see alsaAndrew Charlesworth, Implementing the European Union 
Data Protection Directive 1995 in UK Law: The Data ProtEction Act 1998, 16 Gov'T INFO. Q. 203, 
215-18 (1999) (discussing the United Kingdom Data Protection Act of 1998 and the uses 
and disclosures permitted by the law); Thea Hooghiemstra, The Implementation of Dinctive 
95/46/EC in the Netherlands, with Sper:ial Regunl to Medica/Data, 9 EuR.J. HEALTH L. 219, 219-
21 (2002) (discussing the Netherlands's Personal Data Protection Act and its exceptions). 
2!1!1 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c) (2000) (establishing notice and comment requirements 
for proposed administrative rules). 
2M U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Office for Civil Rights, http:/ /www.hhs.gov/ 
ocr/contacthtml (last visited Feb. 23, 2007). 
"'Id. 
"'42 u.s.c. § 12112(d) (2000). 
~7 Id. 
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provision could be revised to indicate explicitly tbat it is impermissi-
ble for employers to use healtb information obtained from external 
sources without tbe informed consent of tbe individuals in question 
and to address tbe security of electronic medical data. As a second 
example, tbe Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act requires financial institutions 
to safeguard tbe confidentiality of tbeir customers' nonpublic per-
sonal information but allows for its disclosure in a variety of circum-
stances.23B This law too could be tightened to establish a more rigid 
prohibition of PHI disclosure and to instruct financial institutions to 
employ appropriate security safeguards for computerized PHI. 
Nevertheless, a piecemeal approach to enhancing PHI protection is 
undesirable. First, from a practical standpoint, legislatures are unlikely 
to revisit numerous statutes in order to address PHI issues. Second, tbe 
process of revising multiple laws to include detailed security mandates 
would be extremely cumbersome. Finally, a statute-by-statute approach is 
likely to lead to inconsistencies in levels of protection furnished by dif-
ferent laws and to tbe introduction of new ambiguities in statutory lan-
guage tbat will require judicial interpretation. By contrast, a revision of 
tbe HIPAA Privacy Rule will comprehensively repair tbe law. Broadening 
tbe definitions of "covered entity" and "healtb information" will signifi-
cantly augment tbe efficacy of tbe HIPAA Security Rule in particular 
and tbe Privacy Rule in general and will address many additional tbreats 
to healtb information privacy. 
B. Allowing for Meaningful Inquiry Regarding the Origins and Uses of PHI 
As explained above, tbe HIPAA privacy regulations allow patients 
to inspect and obtain copies of tbeir PHI from covered entities. 239 So 
long as tbe only entities covered by HIPAA are healtb plans, healtb care 
clearinghouses, and healtb care providers, tbe origins and uses of tbe 
documents generally should be obvious from the documents them-
selves and the party from which tbey were obtain.ed. However, if tbe 
privacy regulations are expanded, as we recommend, to cover any per-
son who knowingly stores or transmits individually identifiable health 
information in electronic form for any business purpose related to tbe 
substance of such information, it will become important for individuals 
~8 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6802 (2000). For example, the statute permits disclosure "to a 
nonaffiliated third party to perform services for or functions on behalf of the financial 
institution, including marketing of the financial institution's own products or services 
.... " Id. § 6802(b)(2). 
"'45 C.F.R § 164.524(a) (!) (2006). 
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to be able not only to have access to Pill that is possessed by others, but 
also to establish the provenance of the data and the manner in which it 
has been used. This evidence will be vital for determining both the ex-
tent of the injury to the individual and the existence of Privacy Rule 
breaches by data sources. 
The requirement of informed consent for the use or dissemina-
tion of Pill should allow individuals to remain educated concerning 
the movement of their Pill in most cases.240 A party that wishes to 
transmit PHI would need to obtain authorization from the affected in-
dividuals. The right of inquiry described above, however, will provide 
an added information resource in cases in which data is obtained acci-
dentally, through the black market, or by other unlawful means. 
The right of inquiry also will serve as a deterrent to malfeasance. If 
a covered entity obtains Pill from a dubious source and then seeks au-
thorization to use it, the data subject is likely to be surprised by the re-
quest for consent and to inquire about the origins of the data. An un-
satisfactory response likely would lead the data subject to refuse to au-
thorize data use and thus, the purchaser will have wasted its effort and 
money in obtaining the PHI. Furthermore, the data subject may file a 
complaint with the government and/ or i,nitiate litigation against the 
source that distributed the Pill in violation of the regulations. The ex-
panded right of inquiry should, consequently, incentivize covered enti-
ties to engage in due diligence to determine the legitimacy of Pill sup-
pliers. Because it provides data subjects with an inexpensive means of 
conducting preliminary investigations concerning potentially inappro-
priate Pill disclosures, this mechanism should also deter regulatory 
violations. 
The privacy regulations allow covered entities to charge a "reason-
able, cost-based fee" for the copying, postage, and labor costs associated 
with providing individuals access to their Pill.241 Additional payments 
could be required for processing of inquiries about the provenance 
and use of Pill. These charges should prevent frivolous inquiries and 
harassment of covered entities by the public. 242 
The process of inquiry should not be excessively burdensome for 
covered entities and could be easily automated. Those processing Pill 
should establish websites to which individuals can submit queries con-
cerning whether the entity possesses their Pill, and, if so, where it origi-
240 See id. § 164.508(a) (discussing the requirement that covered entities obtain authori-
zation for the use and disclosure of PHI); supra notes 224-235 and accompanying tex:L 
241 See45 C.F.R. § 164,524(c)(4). 
24!!. See id. 
I 
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nated and how it has been used. Generally, respondents will be able to 
develop boilerplate answers to diminish the need for individually de-
signed narratives. For example, common responses might be "obtained 
from Hippo Direct list"24.'1 and "used for marketing purposes." 
C. Enhandng Compliance Guidelines 
The Security Ru1e provides a dearth of specific instructions for 
regulatory compliance, preferring to assume good judgment on the 
part of covered entities.244 This approach leaves a vacuum of guidance 
for health care providers with no technological expertise.245 It also 
could encourage malfeasance by prosperous covered entities that could 
invest significant resources in ensuring the security of electronic PHI, 
but that instead choose to take miniroal precautions.246 We recommend 
that a number of steps be taken to provide more specific guidance to 
covered entities. 
1. Augmenting the Implementation Specifications 
The HIPAA Security Rule offers skeletal and vague implementa-
tion specifications that leave many substantial gaps and loopholes. Con-
sequently, a more robust scheme of standards and implementation 
specifications would significantly advance the goal of improved security 
protection for PHI.247 
First, a clarification should be made to the phrase "criticality of po-
tential risks" in the Security Rule's "flexibility of approach" provisions24B 
and the "risk analysis" requirement in the administrative safeguards' 
iroplementation specifications. 249 It should be clarified to indicate that 
243 See Hippo Direct, supra note 134. 
244 See 45 C.F.R § 164.306(b) (1) (stating that "[c]overed entities may use any security 
measures that allow the covered entity to reasonably and appropriately implement the 
standards and implementation specifications as specified in this subpart"); supra notes 
141-157 and accompanying text Covered entities are instructed to consider se·veral factors 
in making their implementation decisions, including their size, complexity, capabilities, 
and technical infrastructure; the costs of the security measures; and the nature of the po-
tential threats to the Pffi they maintain, but they are given no assistance in making specific 
implementation decisions. 45 C.F.R § 164.306(b) (2). 
"' See45 C.F.R. § 164.306{b) (I) (2006). 
246 See id. 
2~7 See supra notes 141-157 and accompanying text (critiquing the Security Rule's 
flexible approach and vague guidance). 
'" 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(b) (2) (iv). 
'" Id. § 164.308(a) {I) (ii) (A); see supra notes 148-150 and accompanying text (critiqu· 
ing these provisions of the Security Rule). 
f-·-~~-----
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the risks to be considered are the risks to all stakeholders, including 
data subjects, covered entities, and business associates. 
Second, because effective risk analysis is crucial to a covered entity's 
ability to choose appropriate security measures, the Rule must provide 
further gilldance as to how risk analysis should be conducted.25° A sim-
ple way to do so would be to require covered entities to follow the NIST 
Risk Management Guide for Information Technology Systems. 251 HHS cited the 
NIST document as authority in its response to comments provided dur-
ing the proposed Security Rule's public comment period,252 but the 
Security Rule itself has no reference to it. We recommend that the 
regulations' risk analysis provision253 be amended to require that cov-
ered entities' risk analyses be consistent with all relevant gilldelines es-
tablished in the NIST Risk Management Guide for Information Technology 
Systems. If HHS determines at a later time that a better document exists 
because the NIST gilldance has become outdated or a superior docu-
ment is issued by a different organization, the regulatory provision 
would need to be changed again to refer to the new source. 254 
Covered entities that cannot implement this guidance themselves 
for lack of expertise or resources could hire vendors to conduct the 
risk analysis for them or provide them with a simplified form of the 
risk analysis procedure that is tailored to their type of entity. Vendors 
that specialize in electronic PHI security will be able to adapt the 
NIST gill dance to particular categories of businesses that they service 
and may be able to accomplish the task by asking clients to fill out a 
relatively short questionnaire that will provide all necessary informa-
tion. The use of vendors for HIPAA compliance purposes is discussed 
in the next subsection of this Article.255 
:so See 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(b){l} (allowing covered entities discretion to choose ap-
propriate security measures). 
m See generally GARY STONEBURNER ET AL., NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., RisK 
MANAGEMENT GUIDE. FOR INFORMATION 'Th:CHNOLOGY SYSTEMS (2002), available at http:/ /csrc. 
nistgov/publications/nistpubs/800-30/sp800-30.pdf. 
'"Health Insurance Refurm' Security Stnndards, 68 Fed. Reg. 8334, 8346 (Feb. 20, 2003). 
'" 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a) (1) (ii) (A) (2006). 
"'A draft international stnndard, ISO/DIS 27799, entitled "Health Informatics--Security 
Management in Health Using ISO/IEC 17799," contains a thorough discussion of threats to 
the security of health information. Seelnt'l Org. for Stnndardization, ISO/DIS 27799, hnp:/ / 
mvw.iso.org/iso/en/CatalogueDetailPage.CatalogueDetail?GSNUMBER=41298&scopelist= 
PROGRAMME (last visited Feb. 23, 2007). If this standard is passed and the risk assessment 
section remains intact, the regulations may need to make reference to ISO 27799 as well, be-
cause, unlike the NIST guidance, it is specific to the health information context 
:!55 See infra notes 269-292 and accompanying text. 
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Third, the Security Rule must induce covered entities to imple-
ment the best current practices of the health informatics and computer 
security communities.256 To that end, the "general requirements" sec-
tion257 should include an additional element, placed before the current 
fourth requirement, worded as follows: "Make reasonable efforts to 
identily and employ best practices relating to security measures, soft-
ware development, validation, maintenance, and software system ad-
ministration that are either commonly used by similarly situated busi-
ness entities and governmental institutions or can be clearly demon-
strated to be superior to best common practices. ''258 The best current 
practices requirement would apply to all standards and implementation 
specifications. Thus, if a covered entity determined that it would not be 
"reasonable and appropriate" to implement an addressable implemen-
tation specification, it would need to document why implementing the 
specification would not constitute best current practices under the cir-
cumstances. 259 
The best current practices standard is essential to making the Se-
curity Rule meaningful in light of the dynamic nature of the computer 
security field. The text of the Security Rule must maintain a level of 
generality and cannot dictate that covered entities adopt specific tech-
'nologies because these could easily become outdated even before the 
regulations are enacted. A ''best practices" standard is an effective way 
to provide some guidance while maintaining sensitivity to the computer 
technology environment. This approach is not unprecedented, given 
that ''best practices" standards are found elsewhere in U.S. law. For ex-
ample, a provision of the Sentencing Guidelines that requires the estab-
lishment of effective compliance and ethics programs allows small or-
ganizations to model their programs partly on the "best practices of 
other similar organizations. "260 Likewise, an Environmental Protection 
Agency regulation relating to hazardous air pollutants instructs covered 
entities to design startup, shutdown, and malfunction plans that "reflect 
the best practices now in use by the industry to minimize emissions. "261 
As discussed below, many if not most covered entities are expected 
to utilize vendors to serve their HIPAA Security Rule compliance 
256 See supra notes 153-154 and accompanying text 
'" &e 45 C.F.R § !64.306(a). 
25B See id. 
"' &e45 C.F.R § 164.306(d) (3) (i), (d) (3) (ii) (B) (I) (2006). 
260 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL§ 8B2.1, cmt n.2(C) (iii) (2005). 
"' 40 C.F.R § 63.2852. 
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needs, 262 and thus, they will not themselves need to engage in the work 
of determining industry standards. Moreover, a plethora of informa-
tion about security standards and industry practices is readily available 
through the Internet and in print, published by reputable organiza-
tions such as ISO, CERT, NIST, and NIAP, as well as software vendors.263 
Both vendors and covered entities should easily be able to access these 
sources, from which best current practices can be ascertained. Al-
though covered entities can rely on a reading of industry literature to 
determine best practices, they should not depend upon one single 
source, given that no comprehensive guidance has been produced to 
cover all aspects of HIPAA Security Rule compliance. Different docu-
ments will be relevant to risk analysis, security vulnerabilities, software 
engineering, system administration, and so on.264 
Fourth, the Security Rule, which currently fails to address software 
engineering, should include language that explicitly focuses on this 
essential security component. The best practices provision described 
above, which would require covered entities to make reasonable efforts 
to ident:ifjr and employ best practices relating to software development, 
validation, maintenance, and systems administration, is one step in the 
right direction. 265 Furthermore, the risk analysis provision should in-
corporate an additional statement that the risks to be considered in-
clude those associated with software development, operation, and 
maintenance.266 Similarly, the risk management provision should be 
elucidated to state that the risks and vulnerabilities at issue include 
those linked to software development, operation, and maintenance.267 
2. Security Product Vendors and Certification 
The previous subsection recommended a "best current practices" 
standard as a general Security Rule requirement.268 The question to 
which we now turn is how ''best practices" should be identified and im-
plemented by covered entities. . 
One option is for CMS, in its oversight capacity, to create a central-
ized repository of information. CMS could maintain a website in which 
it describes the security measures and technology needed by different 
262 See infra notes 269-292 and accompanying text 
!!fi! See infra notes 293--318 and accompanying text. 
254 See infra notes 293--318 and accompanying text 
265 See supra notes 256--261 and accompanying text. 
"'See 45 C.F.R. § l64.308(a)(ii) (A) (2006). 
"'Seeid. § l64.308(a)(ii)(B). 
268 See supra notes 256--261 and accompanying text. 
374 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 48:331 
entities for compliance purposes, provides a current list of known secu-
rity vulnerabilities in health information systems and the computing 
platforms they rely upon, and designates the updates and fixes that are 
sufficient to address these problems. 
This approach, however, may run afoul of the notice and comment 
requirements established by the Administrative Procedure Act.269 A 
binding set of technical requirements could be interpreted to consti-
tute rule making, which would trigger public notice and comment re-
quirements. 27° These, in turn, would generate significant delays and 
render it impossible for CMS to respond to rapidly changing technol-
ogy and emerging security threats in a timely fushion. The Act estab-
lishes an exception for cases in which an "agency for good cause finds 
(and incorporates the finding and a brief statement of reasons there-
fore in the rules issued) that notice and public procedure thereon are 
impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.'~71 It is 
possible but not certain that this exception would apply to the above-
described website. 
Several other problems are inherent in the centralized repository 
approach. CMS would require significant additional funding and per-
sonnel resources to produce and continuously update a comprehensive 
set of materials for the website, and it would need to develop technical 
expertise that it does not currently have. Furthermore, relying on a sin-
gle source of information means that any mistakes or flaws in the in-
formation could affect all covered entities. Finally, if the government 
retains power to designate best current practices, covered entities' se-
curity obligations might vacillate significantly with changes in the po-
litical environment. Thus, some administrations might articulate very 
demanding standards and others very lax ones. 
A superior alternative would be to allow best current practices to 
emerge through the free market. Presumably, members of the com-
puter security industry would compete to produce the best possible 
products at a reasonable cost. As a check against market flaws that gen-
erate low standards within private industry, covered entities also would 
be instructed to research, as part of their best practices analysis, the 
computer security measures that are adopted by the government.272 
269 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c) (2000) (establishing notice and comment requirements 
for proposed administrative rules). 
270 See id. 
211 !d.§ 553(b) (3) (B). 
272 See supra notes 256-261 and accompanying text (explaining that best practices are 
those commonly used by industry and governmental institutions). 
~~-----' 
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Many covered entities will lack the technical knowledge and re-
sources to identiJY best current practices and achieve Security Rule 
compliance and will require the services of computer security profes-
sionals. To that end, it would be useful for CMS to maintain on its web-
site a list of approved vendors that can be retained by covered entities 
for purposes of achieving Security Rule compliance. The vendors 
would provide both products and technical assistance and would need 
to have not only technical expertise but also thorough fumiliarity with 
the HIPAA Security Rule. The vendors would be certified based on 
proof that their technology is state-of-the-art and Security Rule compli-
ant, that they have not been negligently responsible for any Security 
Rule breaches, and that they are able to address critical new security 
threats through timely user advisories, software improvements, and 
automatic installation of software updates.27> Vendors would also have 
to be certified for entities of particular sizes and types, because differ-
ent business environments require different services. 
Covered entities that retain the certified vendors would be pre-
sumed to have complied with the Security Rule's requirements, though 
the presumption could be rebutted by evidence that they failed to fol-
low the vendor's instructions or refused to accept the vendor's recom-
mendations. It also could be rebutted with evidence that the covered 
entity knew or should have known that the vendor was not actually pro-
viding products and services that were Security Rule compliant.274 This 
would occur in instances in which a vendor had been exposed by a 
whistle blower or the media as engaging in quackery or the sale of inef-
fective products. The rebuttable presumption would provide protection 
against under-scrutiny by the government during the certification 
process and against vendors that might act in bad faith after they are 
certified in order to under-sell competitors or enjoy greater profits. 
Where appropriate, the vendors should provide clients with alter-
natives from which they can select, depending on their resources and 
capabilities. For example, covered entities that are experiencing finan-
cial difficulties could be given the option of de-identiJ}ring all of their 
273 The government licenses and recertifies individuals and entities in other contexts. 
For example, attorneys must pass the bar in order to practice law and, in many states, must 
earn a certain amount of CLE credit each year to retain their licenses. Similarly, nursing 
homes are certified and periodically surveyed for purposes of recertification. See Senator 
Charles Grassley, The Resurrection of Nursing Home Refonn: A Historical Account of the Recent 
Revival of the Quality of Care Standards for Long-Term Care Facilities Established in the Omnibus 
Reconciliation Act of 1987, 7 ELDER LJ. 267, 271-72 (1999). 
274 See supra note 273 and accompanying text 
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electronic PHI. This would entail associating a new, automatically gen-
erated identifier, such as a random number, with a patient's electronic 
health record. A list mapping these identifiers to patients' names 
and/or Social Security numbers would be maintained only in paper 
form. This approach would constitute an inexpensive and simple alter-
native to implementing sophisticated, technological security measures. 
Furthermore, to achieve Security Rule compliance, covered enti-
ties should have ongoing relationships with vendors so that vendors can 
provide software updates as the need arises and reassess entities every 
year or two to ensure that they continue to employ current and appro-
priate security practices.275 Covered entities that do not hire one of the 
approved vendors will be responsible for developing their own imple-
mentation measures, which must be at least as effective as those pro-
vided by certified vendors. 
Proposals for certification by CMS were discussed in the comments 
to the proposed Security Rule.276 CMS asserted that it did not intend to 
establish certification criteria for covered entities because it did not 
"have the resources to address the large number of different business 
environments."277 Similarly, CMS refused to "assume the task of certifY-
ing software and off-the-shelf products" for lack of resources and exper-
tise.27B Instead, CMS believed that compliance assessment instruments 
should be developed and implemented by the private marketplace.279 
Certification of vendors, rather than covered entities or products, 
was not discussed in the comments.280 This type of certification may be 
less burdensome for CMS, because there should be fewer vendors than 
covered entities or products. It is likely, however, that CMS still would 
argue that it lacks sufficient resources and expertise to certifY even 
vendors alone. 
Nevertheless, CMS should reconsider its unwillingness to provide 
some form of certification for compliance purposes. Several comments 
to the proposed Security Rule emphasized the need for a list of feder-
ally approved security products and for certification procedures.281 This 
need is acute for small covered entities that do not have the funds, per-
275 The. reassessment might be easily achieved through a well~tailored questionnaire. 
276 See Health Insurance Reform: Security Standards, 68 Fed. Reg. 8334, 8352 (Feb. 20, 
2003). 
277 ld. 
278 Jd. 
279 I d. 
!!Bo I d. at 8351-52. 
281 See Health Insurance Reform: Security Standards, 68 Fed. Reg. at 8352. 
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sonnel, and computer proficiency to assess their Security Rule compli-
ance or to determine which commercially available security products 
they should purchase in order to fulfill regulatory requirements. With 
vendor certification, resource-poor covered entities would have an ac-
cessible and reliable mechanism to achieve compliance. 
CMS acknowledged that other governmental entities are adopting 
the certification approach.282 For example, NIST and the National Se-
curity Agency (the "NSA") have established the National Information 
Assurance Partnership, whose goal is to help information technology 
producers and consumers meet their security testing and assessment 
needs.283 To that end, the NSA has established the TEMPEST284 En-
dorsement Program, through which it provides lists of TEMPEST tele-
communications equipment, TEMPEST test services facilities, and 
Commercial Off-the-Shelf telecommunications equipment that it has 
endorsed. 285 Germany has embraced certification to a much larger ex-
tent. Its Federal Office of Information Security (the "BSI") provides 
certification services through which information technology products 
and systems are tested and certified. 286 
In the comments to the proposed Security Rule, HHS stated that it 
encourages professional associations to undertake assessment and im-
plementation activities with respect to HIPAA security requirements.287 
Assuming that the demand for certified products grows dramatically 
with the expansion of the "covered entity" definition, it is likely that 
some organizations would become interested in providing certification 
services for a fee. 
If CMS cannot certiJY the vendors themselves, at the very least it 
should certiJY entities that provide certification services. There is 
precedent for this practice as well. Germany's BSI not only certifies in-
'" Health Insurance Reform: Security Standards, 68 Fed. Reg. 8334, 8352 (Feb. 20, 
2003) (stating that HHS has "noted with interest that other Government agencies such as the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NISf) are working towards that end"). 
WI See Nat'! Sec. Agency Cent Sec. Serv., National Information Assurance Partnership, 
http:/ /www.nsa.gov/ia/industry/niap.cfm (last visited Feb. 23, 2007). 
284 TEMPEST INC., http:/ /www.tempest-inc.com/home.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2007). 
TEMPEST INC. "offers TEMPEST/EMSEC and Electromagnetic Compatibility testing and 
design services in accordance with current Military, FCC, Arntralian & European Community 
Requirements." Jd. 
21!5 Nat'! Sec. Agency CenL Sec. Serv., Tempest Endorsement Program, http:/ /www.nsa. 
gov/ia/industry/tempesccfm?Menu!D=l0.2.1.3 (last visited Feb. 23, 2007). 
286 Bundesarnt fiir Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Department 3: Certification, 
Approval and Conformity Testing, New Technologies, http:/ /WW>v.bsi.de/english/depart-
ment3.hun (last visited Feb. 23, 2007). 
287 Health Insurance Reform: Security Standards, 68 Fed. Reg. at 8352. 
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formation technology security products, but also accredits and licenses 
evaluation facilities so that they can assess information technology 
products and systems.288 ISO, a well-respected nongovernmental global 
federation established in 1946 to promote "the international exchange 
of goods and services" through the creation of uniform standards,289 
has issued several standards that provide best practices guidance to 
those operating certification systems. 290 One of these, ISO Guide 65, has 
been adopted by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and is applied to 
companies operating product certification standards for livestock, 
meat, seed, and other agricultural products.2" CMS also could adopt 
appropriate ISO certification guidelines so that it would not have to 
wholly invent its own criteria. The certification bodies that are accred-
ited by CMS would in turn certifY vendors, and use of the certified ven-
dors' products would create a rebuttable presumption of HIPAA secu-
rity compliance, as described above.292 The certifYing bodies would 
have to be recertified by CMS periodically to ensure their continued 
competence. Furthermore, the CMS website would list the certifying 
bodies, which would then direct covered entities to the vendors they 
have approved. 
3. Existing Tools and Emerging Technologies 
Ultimately, the electronic PHI security business could develop into 
a sophisticated international industry.293 Some tools that will facilitate 
regulatory compliance and certification already exist. These tools can 
be used to determine best current practices in various areas covered by 
the Security Rule. 
ISO and the International Engineering Council ("IEC'') have pub-
lished a variety of standards describing sound information security prac-
!!Ba Bundesamt fiir Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, supra note 286. 
289 Paulette L. Stenzel, Can the ISO 14000 Series Environmental Management Standards 
Provide a Viable Alternative to GuucrnmentRegulntion?, 37 AM. Bus. LJ. 237,240 (2000). 
290 ISO, Combined Search Result for "Certification," http:/ /www.iso.org/iso/en/ 
CombinedQueryResultCombinedQueryResult?queryString=certification (last visited Feb. 
23, 2007). 
·
291 See U.S. Dep't of Agric., USDA ISO Guide 65 Program, http:/ /www.ams.usda.gov/ 
lsg/arc/iso65.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2007). 
292 See supra note 274 and accompanying text 
!!9S See Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, The Tort of Negligent Enablement of Cyber-
crim~ 20 BERKELEY ThcH. LJ. 1553, 161{}-11 (2005) (noting that "[w]ith cybercrimes sky-
rocketing and an ever-increasing amount of sensitive information being exchanged on the 
internet, the development of robust and trustworthy computer systems is a necessity" and 
urging that "[m]ore security-conscious network architects, sofnvare designers, and website 
developers are the solution"). 
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tices. The ISO/IEC 17799:2005, entitled "Information Technology-Se-
curity Techniques-Code of Practice for Information Security Manage-
ment," establishes gilldelines and "general priociples for initiating, im-
plementing, maintaining, and improving information security manage-
ment in an organization" by describing best practices in these areas.294 
ISO/IEC 27001:2005 specifies the requirements for initiating, operating, 
and monitoring an information security management system in light of 
the organization's overall business risks.295 ISO/IEC 15408, known as the 
Com1!Wn Criteria, establishes an international standard for computer se-
curity specifications and evaluations.296 Finally, ISO 27799, entitled 
''Health Informatic&-Security Management in Health Using ISO/IEC 
17799," will apply specifically to health information security, if ap-
proved.297 We reviewed a current draft of ISO 27799 and found it to be 
promising, and to provide more thorough and relevant guidance than 
currently exists in other documents. 
ISO, IEC, and the Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineer-
ing (''IEEE") have also developed a large number of standards and 
gilldelines for various aspects of software engineering. Notable examples 
include ISO/IEC 90003:2004, entitled "Software Engineeriog-Guide-
lines for the Application of ISO 9001:2000 to Computer Software,"29B 
which provides gilldance for organizations concerning the acquisition, 
supply, development, operation, and maintenance of computer software 
and related support services, and ISO/IEC 12207, entitled ''Information 
Technology--Software Life-Cycle Processes,''299 which establishes a sys-
tem for software life-cycle processes. 
In addition, at least one national organization is already devoted to 
research and development concerning Internet security. CERT is a fed-
erally funded center of computer security expertise, operated out of 
Carnegie Mellon University's Software Engineeriog Institute.300 It stud-
"" ISO, ISO/IEC 17799:2005, http:/ /www.iso.org/iso/en/CatalogueDetaiiPage.Cata-
logueDetail?CSNUMBER=39612&1CSI=35&ICS2=40&1CS3= (last visited Feb. 23, 2007). 
'" ISO, ISO/IEC 2700I:2005, http:/ /www.iso.org/iso/en/CatalogueDetaiiPage.Cata-
logueDetaii?CSNUMBER=42I03&1CS1=35&1CS2=40&1CS3= (last visited Feb. 23, 2007). 
296 See generally COMMON CRITERIA FOR INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SECURITY EVALUA-
TION: UsER GuiDE (1999), available at http:/ /wvYlv.comrnoncriteriaportal.org/public/files/ 
ccusersguide. pdf. 
297 ISO/DIS 27799, supra note 254. 
'" ISO, ISO/IEC 90003:2004, http:/ /www.iso.org/iso/en/CatalogueDetaiiPage.Cata-
logueDetaii?CSNUMBER=35867&ICS1=35&ICS2=80&1CS3= (last visited Feb. 23, 2007). 
'" ISO, ISO/IEC 12207:1995, http:/ /www.iso.org/iso/en/CatalogueDetai!Page.Cata-
logueDetaii?CSNUMBER=21208&1CS1=35&1CS2=80&1CS3= (last visited Feb. 23, 2007). 
!IOO See Carnegie Mellon Univ., Software Eng'g Inst., CERT Coordination Center, http:/ I 
www.certorg (last visited Feb. 23, 2007). 
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ies Internet security vulnerabilities and long-term changes in net-
worked systems and develops information and training to promote im-
proved security. 301 Among its other features, CERT's website offers se-
curity alerts and solutions.302 Certification bodies could require vendors 
to follow CERT's recommendations in order to attain certification, and 
covered entities not utilizing vendors could also rely on these for guid-
ance. 
The NIST, discussed above, 303 has produced not only important 
guidance concerning risk analysis,'04 but also a website entitled "Na-
tional Vulnerability Database. "'05 The website states that the database is 
"a comprehensive cyber security vulnerability database that integrates 
all publicly available U.S. Government vulnerability resources and pro-
vides references to industry resources. "3°6 
The list of standards and resources provided above is not meant to 
be exclusive, and, because of the ever-changing nature of technology 
and security threats, it would be impractical to attempt to develop a 
comprehensive list that would endure over time. Certification bodies 
should be expected to remain updated concerning guidelines and re-
sources that are relevant to Pill security and should distribute perti-
nent information to their certified vendors. Similarly, under the "best 
current practices" standard discussed above, covered entities that do 
not take advantage of certified vendors would be expected to follow 
applicable industry standards and guidelines for IDPAA compliance 
. purposes. As an additional aid, CMS should maintain on its website an 
updated, nonexclusive list of documents and Internet sources that it 
recommends to covered entities. 
· It should also be noted that in the comments concerning the pro-
posed Security Rule, HHS acknowledged that it is required to adopt in-
dustry standards developed by standards-developing organizations that 
are accredited by the American National Standards Institute ("ANSI") ,307 
SOl Jd . 
.!102Jd. 
sos See supra notes 154, 263 and accompanying text. 
!D4 See supra text accompanying notes 251-254. 
305 National Vulnerability Database, http:/ /nvd.nistgov (last visited Feb. 23, 2007). Al-
though it is produced by NIST, the database is sponsored- by the Deparunent of Homeland 
Security's National Cyber Security Division. ld. 
3116 Id. As of February 23, 2007, the database contained 22,653 vulnerabilities. Id. 
'
07 Health Insurance Reform: Security Standards, 68 Fed. Reg. 8334, 8345 (Feb. 20, 
2003). However, 42 U.S.C. § l320d-l (c) {2) (B) (2000) provides that "[i]f no standard set-
ting organization has developed, adopted, or modified any standard relating to a standard 
that the Secretary is authorized or required to adopt, n the Secretary may create his own 
standard. 
-----.,-.~--~---- ~ 
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the U.S. representative ofiSO and IEC.'0B In 2003, HHS concluded that 
the available security standards were not technology-neutral, were incon-
sistent with HIPAA, and were too narrow to be adopted in the final 
Rule.'09 The advent of ISO 27799, which will specifically address health 
information security,310 should cause HHS to reevaluate its conclusion 
and may require revision of the Security Rule to include the new stan-
dard's adoption. 
It is reasonable to expect that implementation of the proposed 
changes to the HIPAA Privacy Rule will influence vendors to provide 
relatively low-cost "turnkey" systems for processing and maintaining 
PHI that will be affordable even for small businesses.m We anticipate 
that all but the largest covered entities will lack the expertise and re-
sources to achieve Security Rule compliance without the assistance of 
an intermecliary, and thus, the development of a market for HIPAA 
compliance aids is essential. 
A Coogle search for HIPAA security turnkey solutions reveals a 
number of organizations already purporting to provide such solutions 
for compliance with the HIPAA Security Rule.'12 Some offer compre-
hensive practice management solutions that combine scheduling; re-
cordkeeping, intraoffice communication, and billing in a single appli-
cation, thereby centralizing all HIPAA-related electronic data.313 Other 
products offer tutorials, templates, documents, and aids aimed at ena-
bling an entity to achieve HIPAA compliance. 314 Still other applications 
sos ANSI, About ANSI-A Historical Overview, http:/ /www.ansi.org/about_ansi/intro-
duction/history.aspx?menuid=l (last visited Feb. 23, 2007). 
~o9 Health Insurance Reform: Security Standards, 58 Fed. Reg. at 8345. 
sto See supra text accompanying note 297 . 
.!Ill Turnkey systems are "built, supplied, or installed complete and ready to operate. n 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1274 (10th ed. 1995). 
s12 Coogle Search for HIPAA Security Turnkey Solutions, http:/ /www.google.com (last 
visited Mar. 7, 2007). 
31!1 See, e.g., AdvancedMD, http:/ /www.advancedmd.com (last visited Feb. 23, 2007); Leo-
nardoMD Online Medicine, http:/ /W"WW.leonardomd.com (last visited Feb. 23, 2007). There 
are two versions of the LeonardoMD product: standard and professional. Leonardo1viD 
Online Medicine, supra. The standard package provides "entry-level practice management 
with registration, scheduling, and messaging," and its cost starts at $150 per month with a 
one-time $1250 setup charge. !d. The professional packag~ is advertised as providing "com-
prehensive practice management with scheduling, charge capture, billing, and integrated 
chart documentation." Jd. Its cost starts at $300 per month, with a $2500 setup charge. !d. 
!114 See, e.g., HipaaManager, http:/ hvww.hipaamanager.com/hm/online_hcat.cfm (last 
visited Feb. 23, 2007); NewGovernance HIPM Privacy Accelerator (HPA)-Product Over-
view (v2.2), http:/ jl.V\VW.newgovernance.com/hpa.httnl (last visited Feb. 23, 2007). The 
standard version ofHipaaManager costs $199, the professional version costs $699, and the 
institutional version is priced at $2999. HipaaManager, supra. 
I 
! 
! 
l 
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are designed for more complex organizations with more sophisticated 
technology. Symantec BindView315 is a compliance management appli-
cation that analyzes an organization's current security profile, suggests 
modifications based on best practices, and monitors and reports com-
pliance-related data (for example, who is accessing files containing 
PHI) .316 Secureinfo RMS317 claims to cut costs, create a standardized 
compliance and accreditation program, and provide packages for regu-
lar aucliting.318 It is likely that increasingly sophisticated and cost-
effective tools will continue to be developed in response to marketplace 
demands for security technology. 
D. Bolstering Enforcement Through a Private Cause of Action 
The HIPAA Privacy Rule's lack of a private cause of action dimin-
ishes its deterrent and remeclial powers. 319 We recommend that the pri-
vacy regulations adopt the approach of many of the other U.S. privacy 
laws and the E. U. Privacy Directive, and establish a private cause of ac-
tion.320 
The HIPAA Privacy Rule's administrative penalties321 should be 
retained alongside the private right of litigation. This approach will al-
low governmental intervention even when no individuals suffer injury, 
such as in cases in which electronic security is inadequately maintained 
but no information is actually obtained by unauthorized third parties. 
It will also introduce the threat of private enforcement in cases that 
would not be prioritized by the government for political reasons or that 
the government does not have the resources to pursue, which may be 
315 Symantec, Regulation Solutions, 1-ITPAA. http:/ /wvvw.bindview.com/solutions/re-
gulations/hipaa.cfm (last visited Feb. 23, 2007). 
!116 /d. 
317 Securelnfo RMS, http:/ /www.secureinfo.com/solutions/certification...accreditation/ 
(last visited Mar. 7, 2007). 
318 /d. 
!119 See supra notes 159-193 and accompanying text 
!120 See supra notes 159-193 and accompanying text. It is well-established that defen-
dants can be subjected to both criminal penalties and punitive damages for the same 
wrong. See United States v. B<tiakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 331 (1998) (holding that the Double 
Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit the institution of both a criminal prosecution and a 
later civil in rem forfeiture action); Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1357-58 (Me. 1985) 
(holding that double jeopardy is not implicated when a defendant is both criminally 
proseCuted and required to pay punitive damages for the same· misconduct because the . 
latter is imposed in a private civil suit rather than a criminal action). 
'" 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d·5 to -6 (2000). 
. -·~------·-··------ ------ ·--- ------~---· ~ 
--------------
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the vast majority of cases.322 Without a private cause of action, covered 
entities may have incentive to conduct a cost-benefit analysis from 
which they conclude that because the cost of compliance is great and 
the risk of being penalized for a violation is very small, they should not 
aggressively invest in PHI security measures.323 
The dual enforcement approach of a private cause of action and 
administrative penalties is adopted by several other U.S. privacy Jaws. S24 
Borrowing from the private cause of action provisions found in other 
privacy legislation, we recommend that the HIPAA statute include the 
following language'25: 
(a) Any person aggrieved by any act of a covered entity in vio-
lation of this section may bring a civil action in a United States 
District Court.S26 
(b) The court may award-
( I) actual damages, but not less than liquidated damages in 
the amount of$2500; 
(2) punitive damages upon proof of willful or reckless dis-
regard of the Jaw; 
(3) reasonable attomey's fees and other litigation costs rea-
sonably incurred; and 
( 4) such other preliminary and equitable relief as the court 
determines to be appropriate_327 
s22 See supra notes 171-172 and accompanying text; see also Stein, supra note 178 (quot-
ing an HHS administrator as acknowledging that the agency has "challenges with our re-
sources investigating complaintsj. 
!12!! See Choi et aL, supra note 2, at 62 (predicting that health care providers will need to 
expend billions of dollars to comply with the HIPAA Privacy Rule). 
'" See Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g), (h) (i)(1) (2000) (establishing private 
cause of action and criminal penalties); Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S. C. 
§§ 2520, 2522(c) (2000) (establishing private cause of action and civil penalties); Driver's 
Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2723-2724 (2000) (establishing criminal pen-
alties and a civil cause of action). 
! 25 The private cause of action should be added to both the administrative regulations 
and the federal statute, given that the means of enforcement are authorized under the 
statute itself. See42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d-5 to 1320d·6 (2000). 
"'See Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g) (1) (D) (providing for a cause of action 
whenever an agency "fails to comply with any other provision of this section, or any rule 
promulgated thereunder, in such a way as to have an adverse effect on an individual"); 
Cable Communications Policy Ac~ 47 U.S.C. § 551(1) (1) (2000) (providing that "[a]ny 
person aggrieved by any act of a cable operator in violation of this section may bring a civil 
action in a United States District Court"). 
!127 See Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 2724 (providing identical 
language). 
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In the future, Congress might consider requiring aggrieved parties 
to exhaust administrative remedies before filing lawsuits in court.328 
Presumably, such a system would filter out many of the weakest cases 
because lawyers and potential litigants would be discouraged by nega-
tive administrative agency findings and would not burden the courts 
with frivolous cases. Effective administrative review, however, is depend-
ent upon a strong network of agency offices that are adequately staffed 
to process a large volume of claims. HHS's anemic HIPAA enforcement 
record indicates that it does not currently have such resources.329 
Some cases brought by private litigants may be complex and large, 
with far-reaching impacts. If vendors or certifYing bodies are suspected 
of being responsible for Security Rule breaches, they could be joined as 
defendants33o under theories of negligence or fraud,'31 or be brought 
in by covered entities as third party defendants. 332 In addition, cases 
involving Security Rule breaches that injure numerous individuals 
could generate class actions with hundreds, thousands, or even millions 
of plaintiffs. 333 
CONCLUSION 
An abundance of evidence confirms that the confidentiality of our 
private health information faces grave threats from a large number of 
sources. The danger of privacy violations will only intensify in the fu-
ture with increased computerization and centralization of health re-
~a ThiB mechanism has been embraced by several employment discrimination laws, which 
establish that potential plaintiffi first must file charges of discrimination with the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission and receive a determination and/or a right to sue before 
filing a lawsuit in court. See Title Vll of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), 
(f) (I) (2000) (describing the Equal Employment Opportunicy Commission's (the "EEOC's") 
charge filing process); Americans with Disabilities Ac~ 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (2000) (adopting 
Title VII's enforcement provisions for the ADA); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
1967, 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (2000) (establishing that civil actions may not be commenced prior 
to the filing of a charge of discrimination with the EEOC). 
329 See supra notes 177-182 and accompanying text (criticizing HI-IS's enforcement of 
HIPAA and reporting that as of June of 2006, the agency imposed no civil penalties on 
covered entities). 
!!lo See FED. R. CIV. P. 20 (discussing permissive joinder of parties). 
!l!ll See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2000) (discussing supplemental jurisdiction, which allows 
tort claims to be joined to related federal statutory claims in some circumstances); FED. R 
Ctv. P. 18 (discussing permissive joinder of claims). 
!1!12 See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (discussing supplemental jurisdiction in federal court cases 
asserting a federal statutory claim); FED. R Crv. P. 14 (discussing third party practice). 
333 See FED. R Crv. P. 23 (discussing class action requirements). 
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cords.334 The U.S. government, which has aggressively promoted the 
use of electronic health records,335 has responded to concerns about 
privacy by enacting HIPAA and its privacy regulations. The legislation 
and regulations are, however, significantly flawed from both legal and 
technical perspectives. Focusing on the HIPAA Security Rule, this Arti-
cle presents recommendations to rectify some of its considerable weak-
nesses. 
The new requirements outlined in this Article would need to be 
phased in gradually. Just as existing covered entities were given several 
years to prepare for compliance with the HIPAA Privacy Rule, new cov-
ered entities should be given the same courtesy. Moreover, time will 
pass before a sufficiently advanced health information security industry 
develops to make effective and affordable products readily available for 
covered entities. The HHS Secretary should determine a reasonable 
compliance deadline for the newly introduced provisions. 
A public education campaign would have to be initiated to educate 
the public about its rights under the revised regulations and to educate 
newly covered entities about their obligations. Similar efforts were 
made when the original privacy regulations were enacted. 336 
The HIPAA Privacy Rule represents a significant regulatory effort 
on the part of the U.S. government and has generated emotional and 
often negative responses from the American public. 337 The recommen-
1154 Stein, supra note 178 (stating that "[p]rivacy advocates say large, centralized elec-
tronic databases wiii be especially vulnerable to invasions, making it even more crucial that 
existing safeguards be enforced") . 
.!135 Mark A Rothstein & Meghan Talbott. Compelled Disclosure of Health Information: Protect-
ing Agninst the Greatest Potential Threat to Privacy. 295 JAMA 2882. 2882 (2006) (discussing the 
creation of the Nationwide Health Information Network pW"SUant to President Bush's call for 
the promotion of interconnected electronic health records); Terry & Francis, supra note 1, at 
1 (noting that in April of 2004, President Bush announced a plan to ensure that Americans' 
health records are computerized within ten years); Office of the Nat'l Coordinator for 
Health Info. Tech., Goals of Strategic Framework, http://www.hhs.gov/healthit/goals.html 
(last visited Feb. 23, 2007) (discussing the goal of computerizing health records to promote 
''workflow efficiencies" and improved patient care). 
~36 See, e.g., HIPAA Compliance Program Offered to Local Companies, DAILY REcoRD (RoehR 
ester), Dec. 26, 2003, at 1 (reporting that "[t]heAlliance for IDPAA Compliance, a diverse 
and well-integrated team of health care attorneys, consultants and administrators who are 
experts in HIPAA issues, offer a program to assist companies in becoming HIPAA. compli-
ant"); Janna Lorenz, Summit Explains New Health Care Rules, TOPEKA CAPITAL-]., Jan. 15, 
2002, at 7A (reporting that "'[aJbout 300 people gathered at the Kansas Expocentre ... to 
learn about the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act and what they should 
do to get their health care organizations into compliance with that legislation"). 
337 Although the HIPAA statute was passed in 1996, the privacy regulations took years 
to develop and did not become effective until 2003. 45 C.F.R § 164.534 (2006). When it 
first published its proposed Rule, HHS received 2350 public comments about iL Health 
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dations detailed in this Article should render the HIPAA Security Rule 
in particular and the HIPAA Privacy Rule in general far more meaning-
ful. They should benefit both patients, whose privacy and autonomy are 
at stake, and organizations seeking guidance concerning compliance 
requirements. It is only with rethinking some of HIPAA's statutory and 
regulatory provisions that electronic PHI will truly constitute protected 
health information. 
Insurance Reform: Security Standards, 68 Fed. Reg. 8334, 8335 (Feb. 20, 2003). The Rule's 
enforcement provisions were not finalized until 2006. HIPAA Administrative Simplifica-
tion: Enforcement, 71 Fed. Reg. 8390, 8390 (Feb. 16, 2006); see also SoLOVE supra note 13, 
at 70 (discussing the controversial nature of the HIPAA regulations). 
